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I. INTRODUCTION
Intuition suggests that preemption is a constitutional issue-when
we ask whether a state law has been nullified because it conflicts with
a federal law, we seem to be asking a constitutional question. But to
an outsider, some of our commentary and practice would suggest that
preemption has little to do with the Constitution at all. Professor
Meltzer, for example, calls preemption a "subconstitutional" issue,1
and Professor Hoke urges that preemption be "de-constitutionalized."2
The Supreme Court treats preemption as a constitutional issue at one
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate, Susman Godfrey LLP. B.A. 2001, University of Texas-Austin; J.D.,
2004, University of Texas-Austin. I am grateful to Jonathan Andron and Varu
Chilakamarri for helpful discussions of this material and for reviewing a draft of
this Article, and to my wife, Amber Pursley, for those things and for her endless
care and support.
1. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. CT. REV.
343, 362.
2. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies & Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 685, 753-54 (1991) [hereinafter Hoke, Pathologies]; see also S. Candice
Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the
Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829, 875-890 (1992) [hereinafter Hoke,
Supremacy] (arguing that preemption issues arise not from the Supremacy
Clause, which creates no substantive rights, but from the federal statute doing
the preempting).
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moment and as a statutory issue the next.3 Unlike other constitu-
tional issues, some courts hold that preemption issues categorically do
not warrant Pullman abstention. 4 The rule that courts should avoid
deciding constitutional questions whenever possible is not uniformly
applied to preemption issues 5 -in fact, courts often decide preemption
questions in order to avoid other constitutional issues.6 Historically,
suits to enjoin enforcement of allegedly preempted state laws did not
qualify under the federal statute providing a special panel of three
district court judges for suits to enjoin enforcement of state law on
federal constitutional grounds. 7
3. Compare, e.g., Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) ("It is,
finally, axiomatic that 'for the purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the constitu-
tionality of local ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of statewide
laws."' (emphasis added) (quoting Hillsborough v. Automated Med. Labs, 471
U.S. 707, 713 (1985))), with Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137-38 (1982) ("We
conclude that this case may be resolved on statutory grounds.... [Tihe New
York no-cash and loss-or-theft rules conflict with valid federal regulations ....
Thus, New York's rules are invalid under the Supremacy Clause.").
4. R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (authorizing abstention where
a federal constitutional question may be mooted by state court resolution of an
undecided issue of state law); see, e.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Muir, 792
F.2d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 1986) ([A] federal court should not abstain under Pullman
from interpreting a state law that might be preempted by a federal law, because
preemption problems are resolved through a nonconstitutional process of statu-
tory construction."), abrogated on other grounds by Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v.
Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986), as recognized by Ford Motor
Co. v. Ins. Comm'r of Pa., 874 F.2d 926, 931-33 (3d Cir. 1989); Fed. Home Loan
Bank Bd. v. Empie, 778 F.2d 1447, 1451 n.4 (10th Cir. 1985) (preemption ques-
tions are not "the type of constitutional issues" that warrant Pullman absten-
tion); Knudsen Corp. v. Nev. State Dairy Comm'n, 676 F.2d 374, 377-78 (9th Cir.
1982) (Pullman abstention was not applicable because "the [preemption] question
is largely one of determining the compatibility of a state and a federal statutory
scheme. No constitutional issues of substance are presented."); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Tully, 639 F.2d 912, 915-16 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting in dicta that preemption issues
involved "statutory and regulatory analysis and interpretation rather than con-
stitutional" adjudication).
5. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., 431 U.S. 265, 272 (1977) (preemption "is
treated as 'statutory' for purposes of our practice of deciding statutory claims first
to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudications"); N.J. Payphone Ass'n v. Town
of W. N.Y., 299 F.3d 235, 239-40 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting the argument of
then-Judge Alito, writing in dissent, that the question of "whether state and fed-
eral laws conflict [is] a 'constitutional question'" and declining to decide poten-
tially dispositive state law issues to avoid deciding the preemption issue); Steven
M. Warshawsky, Turning the Supremacy Clause on Its Head: Bell Atlantic Mary-
land, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 191 (2001) (arguing
against applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to preemption
questions).
6. E.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 137-38 (preemption was a "statutory ground" for decision
that avoided a constitutional question).
7. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1965). The statute, previously
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2281, was amended in 1976 to limit the availability of the
three-judge procedure to cases involving certain constitutional apportionment
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Preemption is obviously a constitutional issue in the sense that it
is accomplished, at bottom, by the operation of constitutional provi-
sions.8 I do not mean to suggest that anyone has missed this simple
point. But this understanding leaves much to be said. The subconsti-
tutional status often accorded preemption is based on the observation
that preemption decisions usually involve the interpretation of federal
statutes rather than the text of the Constitution. 9 This peculiar fea-
ture of preemption decisions, the argument runs, distinguishes them
qualitatively from constitutional decisions.1O These views do not ap-
pear to depend on judgments about the relative importance of preemp-
tion in the hierarchy of constitutional issues." Rather, preemption is
separated from constitutional issues categorically. One result is that
preemption questions are decided by federal courts more often, and
with fewer procedural (and perhaps psychological) obstacles, than
other constitutional questions.
challenges or claims for which three-judge adjudication is required by another
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2000); see Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175, 189 (3d
Cir. 2001).
8. See, e.g., Douglas, 431 U.S. at 271-72 (noting that preemption is "basically consti-
tutional in nature, deriving its force from the operation of the Supremacy
Clause"); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 534 n.5 (1974) ("[A] suit to have a state
statute declared void and to secure the benefits of the federal statute with which
the state law is allegedly in conflict cannot succeed without ultimate resort to the
Federal Constitution[.]"); Wickham, 382 U.S. at 115 (similar); Hoke, Pathologies,
supra note 2, at 753-54.
9. Two other arguments at times are advanced. First, some pin the "subconstitu-
tional" status of preemption on the fact that a judicial decision invalidating a
state law on preemption grounds-as opposed to, say, equal protection grounds-
can be overturned by congressional action to modify the preempting federal stat-
ute. See Douglas, 431 U.S. at 272 n.6; Hoke, Pathologies, supra note 2, at 754-55;
Daniel J. Simon, Comment: Abstention Preemption: How the Federal Courts have
Opened the Door to the Eradication of "Our Federalism," 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1355,
1375-79 (2005). This distinction is false. It is simply not true that no other con-
stitutional decisions are subject to legislative override. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg,
Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 1038-39 & n.170 (1994)
(collecting cases where the Court notes statutes that expressly overrule constitu-
tional judicial decisions). Second, some distinguish between the constitutional
provisions that authorize preemption and "substantive" constitutional provisions.
See, e.g., N.J. Payphone Ass'n, 299 F.3d at 239 n.2 ("[F]ederal preemption is gen-
erally an issue requiring the determination of congressional intent rather than
resolving a constitutional problem of substance."); Hoke, Pathologies, supra note
2, at 755. As I explain later in Part III, this distinction assumes the answer to
the question of the textual source of the constitutional norm authorizing preemp-
tion; but the question is far from settled.
10. Hoke, Pathologies, supra note 2, at 755.
11. The Supreme Court made clear that the relative "importance" of preemption is
not the ground for distinguishing preemption from other constitutional issues, at
least in its own prior decisions, stressing that "[tihere is no greater federal inter-
est in enforcing the supremacy of federal statutes than in enforcing the
supremacy of explicit constitutional guarantees." New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v.
Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 365 (1989).
[Vol. 85:912
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This is no doubt troubling to those, like Professor Young, who re-
gard preemption as the central challenge for modern federalism the-
ory.12 Congressional and judicial preemption decisions mark off the
boundaries of federal and state regulatory authority. When state laws
are preempted, state regulatory authority is diminished. The ability
of the states to provide meaningful benefits to their citizens through
regulation is central to the states' influence in the national political
process. States' influence in national politics, in turn, is an essential
check on the power of the national government. 13 In addition, state
regulatory diversity-valued both for its expression of the varied in-
terests of a heterogeneous public and for its ability to promote the im-
provement of policy generally-is diminished when state laws are
preempted.14
Where Congress is otherwise constitutionally empowered to act,
Congress's authority to preempt appears to admit of no textual limita-
tion'5-it is bounded only by the limitations of legislative imagina-
tion, and whatever structural requirements can be distilled from
concepts of constitutional federalism. But Young insists that a major-
ity of the Supreme Court has not regarded preemption as having
much to do with federalism either.16 Nevertheless, "the importance of
preemption cases for federalism is not diminished by the fact that pre-
emption cases do not arrive at the Court ... with constitutional red
flags attached."17 Preemption rightfully is regarded as "enormously
important" i8  and should take center stage in our federalism
debates. 19
12. See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Compe-
tence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1848 (2005)
[hereinafter Young, Federalism Doctrine] ("I have argued for some years now that
the most important problem of federalism doctrine is how to limit federal preemp-
tion of state law."); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1, 130-34 (2004) [hereinafter Young, Federalisms] ("To the extent
that virtually all regulatory authority is concurrent now . . . then preemption
ought to emerge as the central preoccupation of constitutional federalism."); Er-
nest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349,
1377-80 (2001) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers].
13. Young, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 1368-73.
14. See Young, Federalisms, supra note 12, at 53-58.
15. Stephen Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 805-07
(1994); Young, Federalisms, supra note 12, at 131-32.
16. Young, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 1381 (noting that "the 'states' rights' Jus-
tices [formerly, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas] seem to forget about federalism when it comes to preemption
cases").
17. Id. at 1384.
18. Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795,
836 (1996).
19. See Young, Federalism Doctrine, supra note 12, at 1848; Young, Federalisms,
supra note 12, at 130-34 (stressing the "centrality of preemption").
915
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These concerns are not completely unaccounted for in judicial doc-
trine. Courts in many cases apply a presumption against preemption
that shifts to Congress the burden to make clear its preemptive in-
tent.20 Through Congress, the states thus have a say in whether state
law is displaced by federal statutes. Still, the number of preemption
decisions has increased dramatically.21 This is not only due to the
increase in the number of preemptive federal laws that naturally ac-
companied the expansion of the administrative state. The fairly re-
cent recognition of additional mechanisms for invalidating state laws
means that the federal legislative process no longer injects state pre-
rogatives throughout the relevant debate. The invalidation of state
laws by the dormant commerce clause, 22 the general federal power
over international affairs,23 federal administrative regulations, 24 and
federal common law25-forms of "preemption" that shift the delibera-
tive process from Congress to the courts-occurs with little or no input
from the states.26 And the evolution of the political process itself has
reduced the effectiveness of process limitations on statutory preemp-
20. See, e.g., Cipallone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
21. See generally U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FED-
ERAL STATUTORY PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LocAL AUTHORITY: HISTORY, INVEN-
TORY, AND ISSUES (1992); David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics,
and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87
CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (1999) ("With the rise of the modern regulatory state has
come an increase in the number of 'preemption disputes' . . . .); cf. Hoke,
Supremacy, supra note 2, at 829-31 & n.5 (noting the increase in the number of
cases between 1946 and 1989 involving the Supremacy Clause). I do not claim
that this increase is somehow attributable to an increase in judicial propensity to
find preemption. I am not concerned with the reasons for the growth so much as
with the fact of it.
22. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564
(1997); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994).
23. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Zschernig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968); see generally Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism,
Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 139 (2001).
24. See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and
Penhurst: A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Ad-
ministrative State, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1197 (2004) (discussing regulatory
preemption).
25. Preemption of state laws by federal common law occurs, for example, in the admi-
ralty arena. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214-18 (1917); see generally
Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1999).
26. See Young, supra note 23, at 175. Young argues that "[b]ecause [the dormancy
doctrines] are enforced by federal courts that neither represent the states nor
face Article I's procedural gauntlet in order to act, such prohibitions evade all of
these structural safeguards. They are consequently much greater threats to state
authority." Id. The same argument goes for preemption by federal common law
rules, which are fashioned and enforced solely by courts. As an aside, it may be
better to consider the dormancy doctrines not to be preemption doctrines at all.
See infra note 63.
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tion.27 Accordingly, some commentators urge that Congress's power
to preempt state law should be subject to stricter judicial limitation.28
But the majority of preemption still is accomplished by federal stat-
utes, and the prevailing view remains that preemption debates prima-
rily should be hashed out in the state-inclusive political process rather
than the courts. Congress retains the lion's share of the authority to
decide whether and how much to preempt; courts engage in "bound-
ary-enforcement," applying rules of decision aimed at ensuring that
Congress takes the time to "decide [the preemption] question in a sen-
sible way."29 To the extent that the rules applied in preemption cases
have proved inadequate to the task of curbing preemption's adverse
effects, the observation that preemption is regarded by many as some-
thing other than a constitutional issue may suggest fruitful avenues of
doctrinal revision.
I do not want to dwell on the normative doctrinal debate. In this
Article, I want to focus on our understanding of the structure of consti-
tutional decisionmaking. Professor Berman suggests the following
standard model of constitutional adjudication: "A court interprets the
Constitution to yield a (judicial) statement of constitutional meaning,
on the back of which it may construct a constitutional rule, which rule
it then applies to the facts to yield a constitutional holding . . .30
Statements of constitutional meaning obviously admit of constitu-
tional "status." And, despite some debate, the constitutional status of
the intermediate rule of decision and the holding is similarly obvious
in many cases.3 1 Preemption, however, blurs the boundary between
constitutional law and ordinary law, bringing the question of constitu-
tional status front and center. 32 The question of preemption's status
goes to both the rules of decision applied in preemption decisions and
27. See Young, Federalism Doctrine, supra note 12, at 1817-18 ("National politicians
tend to protect the interests of their private constituents but may often view state
political institutions as competitors; to the extent that vertical representation of
state interests is effective, it may facilitate the horizontal imposition of powerful
states' preferences on other states; and much federal law is produced through
processes that avoid the 'political safeguards of federalism' altogether [such as
rulemaking by executive agencies]."); Hoke, Pathologies, supra note 2, at 691-93.
28. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 1313, 1328-32 (2004); Stephen Gardbaum, Congress's Power to Preempt the
States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 51-59 (2005); Gardbaum, supra note 18, at 819-32.
29. Young, Federalism Doctrine, supra note 12 at 1834-35, 1849-50 (arguing that the
presumption against preemption and other "[riules of statutory construction are
a form of collaborative enforcement: They employ judicial doctrine not to limit
federal regulatory authority in its own right, but rather to enhance the political
and procedural safeguards that safeguard state regulatory autonomy").
30. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 38 (2004).
31. See id. at 30-50 (surveying the debate over the legitimacy of so-called "prophylac-
tic rules").
32. See, e.g., Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Nev.,
614 F.2d 206, 209-10 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Whether preemption constitutes a consti-
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the legal principles those rules purport to implement. Statements of
constitutional meaning are noticeably absent, and the doctrinal rules
applied to the facts, more often than not, appear to be ordinary rules
of statutory construction. Despite strong intuition, then, the adjudica-
tion of preemption issues seems out of sync with our standard model of
constitutional adjudication. But I want to resist the temptation to
concede that preemption decisions involve something other than con-
stitutional adjudication. Instead, I suggest that preemption decisions,
properly understood, fit a more nuanced version of the standard
model.
One of the principal goals of this Article is to show that, although
preemption decisions appear to be primarily about statutory interpre-
tation, this is not a reason to distinguish the adjudication of preemp-
tion questions from constitutional adjudication. My thesis is that the
adjudication of preemption issues is constitutional adjudication full
stop. In Part II, I elaborate on the standard model of constitutional
adjudication and the ways that preemption decisions apparently fail
to track it. In Part III, I argue that the adjudication of preemption
issues must be constitutional adjudication because preemption hold-
ings, insofar as they invalidate state laws, are necessarily constitu-
tional. Assuming that constitutional holdings may only be generated
by the application of constitutional rules, I suggest a way that the
rules applied in preemption cases may be understood to be constitu-
tional adjudicatory rules. Finally, continuing to work backward
through the standard model, I argue that traditional judicial state-
ments of constitutional meaning are absent from preemption decisions
because the operative constitutional norms are judicially under-
enforced. In instances of underenforcement, a statement of constitu-
tional meaning is not a necessary condition for constitutional
adjudication. By adding the possibility of judicial underenforcement
to the standard model, preemption decisions more readily fit and may
be more readily recognized as instances of constitutional adjudication.
In Part IV, I explain why it is important to understand preemption
decisions in this way.
II. PREEMPTION'S "FIT" PROBLEM
I begin this Part by fleshing out the standard model of constitu-
tional adjudication. Because I take the nature of preemption to be of
some specific importance to constitutional practice for reasons I ex-
plain more fully in Part IV, I will resist dwelling on broader debates,
such as the general debate over the nature and legitimacy of constitu-
tutional or statutory issue has elicited from the Supreme Court varying
responses.").
[Vol. 85:912
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tional doctrine-making. 33 Next, I explain more fully preemption's fail-
ure to fit the standard model. I introduce three categories of
preemption decisions: "dormant" preemption decisions which, though
often lumped in with the rest of preemption cases, actually fit the
standard model; "impossibility" preemption decisions, which also fit
the standard model; and what I will call "modern" preemption deci-
sions, which do not fit the standard model. This is not an exhaustive
taxonomy. I am not, for example, going to examine decisions involving
preemption by federal common law. Such decisions are comparatively
rare and their legitimacy is widely questioned. 34 Nor will I directly
address federal regulatory preemption, which is derivative of congres-
sional preemptive authority. I want to focus here on the more com-
mon and well-established varieties of preemption-preemption's
"central cases." I take these to be those decisions involving the pre-
emption of state statutes by federal statutes.
A. The Structure of Constitutional Adjudication
Before the fairly recent proliferation of metadoctrinal constitu-
tional scholarship, 3 5 constitutional adjudication generally was
thought to consist of two steps: interpretation of the constitution and
application of that interpretation to the facts, resulting in a constitu-
tional holding.3 6 The constitutional holding is a readily distinguisha-
ble subpart of the adjudicatory process; it is the part of the decision
where the court explains whether or not the constitution bars the
challenged conduct. A central metadoctrinal insight is that "the con-
33. See Berman, supra note 30, at 43-50. Professor Berman divides this debate into
camps: "'Taxonomists (like Monaghan, Sager, and Fallon) who advocate some-
thing like the 'complex' model of constitutional adjudication [and] 'Pragmatists'
(like Strauss, Levinson, Caminker, and Hills) who insist that constitutional adju-
dication is instrumental 'all the way up."' Id. at 50. Compare, e.g., Henry P.
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975), Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978), and
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing
the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997), with David A. Strauss, The Ubiq-
uity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988), Daryl J. Levinson,
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999),
and Evan H. Caminker, Lecture, Miranda and Some Puzzles of "Prophylactic"
Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
34. See, e.g., Craig H. Allen, Federalism in the Era of International Standards: Fed-
eral and State Government Regulation of Merchant Vessels in the United States
(Part III), 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 85 (1999); Ernest A. Young, The Last Brooding
Omnipresence: Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and the Unconstitutionality of Pre-
emptive Federal Maritime Law, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1349 (1999); Young, supra
note 25.
35. Berman, supra note 30, at 4; see also id. at 5-6 (noting "metadoctrinal
ascendance").
36. Id. at 32-33.
919
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ventional picture ignores that the application of constitutional mean-
ing to the facts of a given 'case or controversy' is often mediated by
judge-made tests of constitutional law that are not most fairly under-
stood as themselves products of judicial constitutional interpreta-
tion."37 These tests are the rules of decision by which courts
determine whether conduct falls within the meaning of a constitu-
tional prohibition or permission, and are separate from the constitu-
tional norms themselves. Professor Fallon, for instance, insists that
constitutional adjudication must be understood as a process of consti-
tutional "implementation," rather than mere interpretation and appli-
cation of the text.3 8 Adjudicative rules must be distinguished from the
logically prior interpretive product for the model to track the practice;
hence steps one and two are separated in the modern version of the
standard model.
There is debate over the nature of these two kinds of judicial work
product, and the terms of the debate vary. 39 Professor Monaghan dis-
tinguishes between "constitutional interpretation" and the making of
"constitutional common law,"4 0 Professor Fallon between elaboration
of "constitutional meaning" and "constitutional doctrine,"41 and Pro-
fessor Sager between construction of "constitutional norms" and con-
stitutional "rules."4 2 The pragmatist strain of metadoctrinal thought
challenges the notion that the interpretive step ever may be "pure"
interpretation of the text-what Professor Monaghan has called "Mar-
bury-shielded constitutional exegesis"43-accomplished without refer-
ence to extratextual considerations. They argue instead that the
process of constitutional adjudication accounts for functional concerns
"all the way up"44 and thus conclude that distinguishing between in-
terpretive and functional judicial work product is pointless. 4 5 Profes-
sor Berman's distinction between "constitutional operative
propositions" and "constitutional decision rules" is agnostic as to
whether or not the pragmatists are right, which makes his a fairly
inert categorization of constitutional doctrine.46
37. Id. at 35.
38. RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 38-44 (2001).
39. See Berman, supra note 30, at 50.
40. Monaghan, supra note 33, at 2-3.
41. Fallon, supra note 33, at 57.
42. Sager, supra note 33, at 1222-24.
43. Monaghan, supra note 33, at 31.
44. Levinson, supra note 33, at 873. See also Strauss, supra note 33, at 207 (stating
that "courts create constitutional doctrine by taking into account both the princi-
ples and values reflected in the relevant constitutional provisions and institu-
tional realities").
45. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 33, at 873; Strauss, supra note 33, at 207-08; see
also Berman, supra note 30, at 45-46 (describing Professor Strauss's views).
46. See Berman, supra note 30, at 12-15 ("[T]o recognize the distinction between op-
erative propositions and decision rules does not depend upon (though is not in-
[Vol. 85:912
2007] THE STRUCTURE OF PREEMPTION DECISIONS 921
Like Professor Berman, here I am concerned only with the distinc-
tion between judicial statements of constitutional meaning on the one
hand and the application of adjudicative rules on the other, regardless
of whether both are, at bottom, determined by instrumental consider-
ations. The adjudicative rules need not resemble, in content or scope,
the constitutional norms that they implement.47 This creates a "stra-
tegic space" between norm and rule, where the content of the rule may
be influenced by instrumental concerns. 48 The play of instrumental
considerations in the creation of doctrinal rules often results in rules
that prohibit more or less conduct than is prohibited by the constitu-
tional norm itself; that is, the strategic space between norms and rules
allows for judicial overenforcement and underenforcement of constitu-
tional norms. 49 The separation of "constitutional interpretation" and
"constitutional rules" and the relationship between the two are critical
to understanding preemption's departure from the standard model.
Three examples will help pinpoint what I am calling preemption's "fit"
problem.
B. Three Categories of "Preemption" Decisions
In Zschernig v. Miller,50 the Supreme Court struck down an Ore-
gon probate statute under the "dormant foreign affairs doctrine."51
The Court explained that "the Constitution entrusts [foreign affairs]
solely to the Federal Government" 52 and that state laws "must give
way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign pol-
icy."53 The Court then set out the rule that state laws are invalid
under this principle if they have a "direct impact upon foreign rela-
tions,"54 but not if they "have only 'some incidental or indirect effect in
compatible with) an assumption that courts derive 'constitutional meaning' in a
fashion uninfluenced by pragmatic or instrumental calculations[.]").
47. See id. at 12 ("As a conceptual matter, the number and variety of options in the
making of constitutional decision rules is limited only by judicial imagination and
by the (ever-changing) constraining norms of professional practice.").
48. See generally Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space
Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985).
49. See generally Sager, supra note 33 (underenforcement); Monaghan, supra note 33
(overenforcement).
50. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
51. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the "One Voice" Myth in U.S. For-
eign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 977 (2001); Jack Goldsmith, Statutory For-
eign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 175, 212.
52. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 436.
53. Id. at 440. The Zschernig Court relied in part on Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941), in which the Court made a similar statement: "Our system of govern-
ment is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the
interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal
power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local inter-
ference." Id. at 63.
54. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441.
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foreign countries."' 5 5 For a nonresident alien to inherit, Oregon's stat-
ute required proof that his or her home government granted Ameri-
cans reciprocal inheritance rights. The Court held the statute
unconstitutional because the required judicial inquiry invited criti-
cism of foreign governments when "the so-called 'rights' are [found to
be] merely dispensations turning upon the whim or caprice of govern-
ment officials."56 This judicial criticism was "forbidden state activ-
ity"5 7 amounting to an "intrusion by the State into the field of foreign
affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and Con-
gress."5 8 Similarly, the Court has interpreted the "negative or dor-
mant implication of the Commerce Clause" to "prohibit[] state
taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens
interstate commerce," 5 9 and has crafted an implementing rule that
"[state] economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures de-
signed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors," will be struck down "unless the discrimination is demon-
strably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic
protectionism. "60
The dormancy doctrines are the subject of interminable debate.6 1
Regardless, decisions invalidating state laws under the dormancy doc-
trines clearly track the standard model. 6 2 The Court interprets con-
55. Id. at 433 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
56. Id. at 434. See also id. at 435-37 (noting several instances of criticism in pub-
lished probate court opinions).
57. Id. at 436.
58. Id. at 432. Justice Brennan's concurrence underscores the constitutional status
of this holding. He believed that the relevant provisions of the Oregon statute "on
their face are contrary to the Constitution of the United States," because they
"launch the State upon a prohibited voyage into a domain of exclusively federal
competence." Id. at 442 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997).
60. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988).
61. Other examples of the invalidation of state law by "dormant" constitutional provi-
sions include Japan Line, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (dor-
mant foreign commerce clause), and South Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917) (dormant admiralty clause). For a sample of the academic commentary on
the dormancy doctrines, see Ernest A. Young, It's Just Water: Toward the Nor-
malization of Admiralty, 35 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 469, 518-19 (2004) (dormant
foreign affairs powers, dormant foreign commerce clause; dormant admiralty
clause); David J. Bederman, Uniformity, Delegation, and the Dormant Admiralty
Clause, 28 J. MAR. L. & Comm. 1 (1997); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, For-
eign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1997); Michael DeBow, Codify-
ing the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1995 PuB. INT. L. REV. 69; and Martin H.
Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitu-
tional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569.
62. Professor Young's observation that, contradistinguished from other forms of pre-
emption, the dormancy doctrines are judicially created and judicially enforced is
suggestive. See Young, supra note 23, at 175-76. The standard model's general
case is, after all, that judicially identified constitutional norms are implemented
by judicially created rules as applied to the facts of specific cases.
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stitutional provisions, or their negative implications, and creates rules
for applying the interpretations to the facts of a case. When a court
invalidates a state law under one of these rules, the holding is un-
doubtedly constitutional, following as it does from the execution of the
other steps of the standard model.63
Where state and federal law logically conflict-"when courts can-
not apply both state law and federal law, but instead must choose be-
tween them"64-and where there is no evidence of congressional
intent to displace state regulatory authority, the holding simply in-
validates the state law as applied.65 The paradigmatic case of this
"impossibility preemption" is Gibbons v. Ogden, where a New York
statute granted a steamboat operator the right to exclude a competing
operator from navigable waters in New York, but the competing oper-
ator was granted a federal license to traverse those same waters.66
The Court in Gibbons explained that if "the laws of New-York ...
have, in their application to this case, come into collision with an act of
Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act entitles
63. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. The Court has expressly acknowl-
edged the constitutional character of its holdings in the dormant commerce
clause cases as well. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,
194 (1994) ("Under these [dormant commerce clause] cases, Massachusetts' pric-
ing order is clearly unconstitutional."). For this reason, I think that calling these
decisions instances of "preemption" is confusing as a conceptual matter (though
likely harmless as a practical matter). See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539
U.S. 396, 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("dormant foreign affairs preemption");
Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An "Idea"
Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 749 ("dormant commerce clause
preemption"); Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delega-
tions, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1579 (2004) ('dormant foreign affairs preemp-
tion"). I personally am guilty of this imprecision, though it made no difference for
my purposes at the time. See Garrick B. Pursley, Rationalizing Complete Pre-
emption After Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson: A New Rule, a New Justifi-
cation, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 371, 389-90 (2006) ("'dormant preemption' doctrines").
64. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 251 (2000). Professor Nelson criti-
cizes the traditional statement that conflict preemption occurs where it is logi-
cally impossible for a person to comply with both the federal and state laws; if
federal law permits something that state law prohibits, it is possible to comply
with both by not engaging in the conduct. See id. at 228 & n.15. This form of
preemption, properly conceived, occurs where a court cannot sensibly apply both
the federal and the state law. It is only impossible to comply with both federal
and state law where one requires something that the other forbids. See id. at
n.15; Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (recognizing as an
actual "case of impossibility" only the situation "in which state law penalizes
what federal law requires").
65. "7[T]he Court has found pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal requirements." English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496
U.S. 72, 79 (1990). See, e.g., AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214
(1998); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
66. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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him . . . the acts of New-York must yield."6 7 This kind of conflict be-
tween state and federal law "does not deprive states of their preexist-
ing, concurrent lawmaking powers in a given area; rather, it means
that a particular state law in conflict with a particular federal law will
be trumped in cases where both apply."68
Impossibility decisions, too, clearly track the standard model; they
are straightforward applications of the Supremacy Clause. It should
not be surprising that in some cases the constitutional text is clear
enough to dictate the outcome without an implementing rule. The
Supremacy Clause provides that federal statutes "shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."69 Other controversies aside, the plain
language at least requires application of federal law where conflicting
federal and state laws are otherwise both applicable.70 In impossibil-
ity cases, the rule spelled out in the constitutional text is applied to
the facts to compel the holding, making for a clear instance of consti-
tutional adjudication, even on the pre-metadoctrinal, two-step model.
I want to emphasize, however, that most modern forms of preemp-
tion cannot fairly be viewed as unmediated applications of the plain
language of the Supremacy Clause.71 The impossibility situation falls
within the core of the meaning of the "to the Contrary" language of the
Clause; other sorts of preemption, such as instances of conflicts be-
tween the goals of the pertinent state and federal laws,72 are not so
clearly contemplated. 73 Another example is express preemption.
There is no obvious reading of the Supremacy Clause that authorizes
Congress to enact a statutory provision affirmatively prohibiting state
67. Id.
68. Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 770. The distinction between rendering an other-
wise applicable state law inapplicable in a given case and invalidating the state
law for all cases ought not detain us. In either case, the validly enacted state law
is stripped of some of its intended effect. That this is the result of preemption is
what is important here.
69. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
70. See Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 770-73; Nelson, supra note 64, at 245-61.
71. See Hoke, Supremacy, supra note 2, at 853 ("Most federal preemption questions
do not present a situation of logical contraries . . . . the types of conflicts
presented for adjudication are more subtle. The Supremacy Clause does not ex-
pressly answer when differences, although not constituting logical contraries, are
sufficient to displace state law."); Nelson, supra note 64, at 251 (arguing that
rules of applicability, priority, and construction may be derived from the
Supremacy Clause, but not without work; moreover, these rules describe not cur-
rent practice but a desirable doctrinal revision).
72. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874-84 (2000) (explaining
that state tort claims against automobile manufacturers regarding use of passive
safety restraints "would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of
devices that the federal regulation sought" and were therefore preempted).
73. See Hoke, Supremacy, supra note 2, at 847-48.
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legislation in a given area without regard to whether the state legisla-
tion will likely turn out to be "contrary to" federal law. 74 Indeed, it is
not clear how the Supremacy Clause permits the displacement of state
regulatory authority at all; on its face, the clause appears to apply
only to already-enacted state laws. 75 Decisions involving these and
other modern varieties of preemption which do not obviously fit the
standard model are the ones I am concerned with.
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly76 is typical of what I am calling
"modern" preemption decisions. The question in Lorillard was
whether Massachusetts cigarette advertising regulations were pre-
empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,77
which expressly prohibited state imposition of tobacco regulations
"based on smoking and health."78 Though the Court referred to the
preemption issue as a "Supremacy Clause claim,"79 aside from a reci-
tation of the language of that clause,SO the Court engaged in no fur-
ther discussion (much less interpretation) of the constitutional text.8 1
Instead, the Court made clear that "[iun [preemption] cases, our task is
to identify the domain expressly pre-empted [by the statute]," and
that "[ciongressional purpose is the 'ultimate touchstone' of our [pre-
emption] inquiry."8 2 To determine the scope of the preemption provi-
74. One might object that where a statute contains an express preemption provision,
any state law that falls within that provision is void under the plain language of
the Supremacy Clause as "contrary" to the preemption provision. But this argu-
ment assumes, rather than explains, the constitutional authorization for congres-
sional enactment of express preemption provisions in the first place. See
Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 775-77.
75. See id. at 773-77 (explaining that express and field preemption cannot be derived
from the Supremacy Clause); Hoke, Supremacy, supra note 2, at 843-53 (arguing
that judicial statements implying that all modern forms of preemption flow di-
rectly from the Supremacy Clause "are not only misleading presentations of law,
but their habitual invocation obscures the complex interpretive task required by
the Supremacy Clause and conceals the analytic morass pervading decisions in
which the Clause is invoked"); see generally Nelson, supra note 64.
76. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
77. Id. at 537; see Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1340 (2000).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000).
79. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 537. The Court sometimes pitches preemption issues in
constitutional lingo at the outset of an opinion. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 630 (1982) ("We first address the holding that the Illinois Take-
Over Act is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause."); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974) ("The question [is] whether the Ohio trade
secret law is void under the Supremacy clause .... "). The confusion over the
constitutional status of preemption issues is not caused by the Court's failure to
consistently call preemption claims "constitutional claims," or by any other lin-
guistic peculiarity. As I said, it appears to flow from the fact that the adjudica-
tion of preemption claims is not like other constitutional adjudications.
80. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 540 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
81. See id. at 540-42.
82. Id. at 541 (quoting Cipallone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
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sion, the Court employed the presumption against preemption8 3 and a
number of conventions of statutory interpretation: the congressional
purpose for the preemption provision, that provision's amendment his-
tory, and the legislative history of the overall statutory scheme.8 4 The
Court concluded that in enacting the preemption provision, Congress
intended to "prohibit[ ] state cigarette advertising regulations moti-
vated by concerns about smoking and health."85 Since the Massachu-
setts regulations "attempted to address the incidence of underage
smoking," a motivation "intertwined with the concern about cigarette
smoking and health," the Court held them preempted.8 6
Leaving aside the holdings, noticeably absent from modern pre-
emption decisions, of which Lorillard is an example, is anything re-
sembling constitutional interpretation or the application of a
constitutional rule. To be sure, the Court often begins by quoting the
Supremacy Clause; but as Professor Gardbaum has observed,
"[S]tatements of preemption law almost routinely 'start from the top'
with a reference to the Supremacy Clause.. . ."87 The mere recitation
of the Supremacy Clause is not "constitutional interpretation" for pur-
poses of the standard model; there is no "determination of constitu-
tional meaning' involved.8 8 Justice Harlan, for one, thought that
deciding preemption questions avoided constitutional interpretation
altogether.8 9 The constitutional rules of the standard model-"the ju-
dicial direction regarding how courts are to decide whether [a state-
ment of constitutional meaning] has been complied with"9 0-are
similarly absent, or at least disguised. As Justice Breyer observed,
the determinative decisional rules applied in preemption decisions ap-
pear to be the rules of "statutory cases where courts interpret the
mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of the law."91 This is
83. Id. at 541-42 ("[W]e 'work on the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States are not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that is the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."' (brackets omitted) (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)).
84. See id. at 542-48.
85. Id. at 548.
86. Id.
87. Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 769.
88. Berman, supra note 30, at 57-58.
89. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees' Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 333 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Because reliance on pre-emption
would invoke the authority of a federal statute through the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause, it would avoid interpretation of the Constitution itself.");
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443, 444-45 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(arguing that the majority should have relied on preemption for its disposition in
order to adhere to the canon of constitutional avoidance).
90. Berman, supra note 30, at 58.
91. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 161 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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so regardless of the type of preemption. Whether it is "express,"92 "im-
plied,"9 3 "impossibility,"94 "obstacle,"95 or "field"96 preemption, courts
focus almost exclusively on questions of statutory construction and
congressional intent. 9 7
One might think that parts of the standard model are absent from
most preemption decisions because all of the steps need only be fol-
lowed in cases of first impression. This brings to mind Professor Fal-
lon's distinction between "extraordinary" and "ordinary"
constitutional adjudication:
In "ordinary" cases the Court-or at least a majority-treats the issue for de-
cision as framed by established doctrine.... [T]he Justices assume that their
obligation of fidelity to the Constitution is met by fidelity to an established
structure for implementing the Constitution, grounds for reasonable disagree-
ment notwithstanding... .By contrast, in "extraordinary" cases, the Court
concludes that it cannot resolve the question before it without either crafting
new doctrine or reconsidering the wisdom or applicability of an existing doc-
trinal framework. 9 8
Courts in ordinary decisions do not engage in original constitutional
interpretation-they need only apply a familiar decisional rule. If the
first step is only necessary in extraordinary decisions, then we should
expand the category of constitutional decisions to include both deci-
sions exhibiting all steps of the standard model-extraordinary deci-
sions-and decisions merely applying rules crafted in extraordinary
decisions.
92. Congress's intent to preempt state law "may be explicitly stated in the [federal]
statute's language." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). See,
e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541-48 (2001); Cipallone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518-24 (1992); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1983).
93. Implied preemption occurs where "the object sought to be obtained by the federal
law and the character of the obligations imposed by it... reveal" a congressional
intent that federal regulatory authority be exclusive. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Res. Conservation & Devel. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 235-36 (1947).
94. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
95. State law is preempted where it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davido-
witz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000);
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156-57 (1982); Frank-
lin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 378 (1954).
96. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
97. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipe-
line Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299 (1988); see Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 785-808 (trac-
ing the history of preemption and the development of modern doctrine and
stressing "The Centrality of [Congressional] Intent" in modem preemption
decisions).
98. FALLON, supra note 38, at 43.
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The logical rub is that ordinary decisions are only constitutional
decisions if they result in constitutional holdings, and thus involve ap-
plication of constitutional decisional rules. In other words, they must
be decided by reference (though not necessarily direct reference 99 ) to
precedent in which the relevant rule was somehow derived from the
Constitution. Ordinary preemption decisions, however, are not appli-
cations of earlier generative decisions in which the standard model
was obviously followed-they are not iterations of any obviously con-
stitutional extraordinary decisions. There are, of course, preemption
decisions that might be called "extraordinary" because they involved
the creation of new doctrinal rules; for example, in the Geier case, the
Court established the rule that an express preemption provision does
not preclude the possibility of broader implied preemption. 100 Other
cases are "extraordinary" because they constitute the first judicial ap-
plication of one of the modern forms of preemption. But even these
cases lack at least the first step of the standard model.
For example, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,11 considered by
many to be a foundational case of modern preemption jurisprudence,
contains no substantive explanation of the operative constitutional
principles. Instead, the Court explained only that
[i]t is clear that since warehouses engaged in the storage of grain for inter-
state or foreign commerce are in the federal domain ... Congress may, if it
chooses, take unto itself all regulatory authority over them..., share the task
with the States, or adopt as federal policy the state scheme of regulation....
The question in each case is what the purpose of Congress was.102
So while Rice may be an "extraordinary" case in that it represents the
first modern application of the field preemption doctrine, the Court
did not interpret the pertinent constitutional provisions or otherwise
explain the operative constitutional norms.
Preemption's fit problem goes beyond the omission of pertinent ci-
tations. The problem is that preemption decisions appear to disclose
neither generalized constitutional decisional rules nor any instances
of constitutional interpretation. Steps one and two of the standard
model are missing.
III. PREEMPTION AND THE STANDARD MODEL
In this Part, I suggest a way that preemption decisions may be un-
derstood to fit the standard model. First, I argue that the holdings of
99. Courts often cite other ordinary decisions that contain a good statement of the
relevant rule rather than the case in which the rule was established. Neverthe-
less, the rule should be ultimately traceable through the cases to an instance of
extraordinary constitutional adjudication.
100. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2001).
101. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
102. Id. at 229-30.
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preemption cases are necessarily constitutional. Because constitu-
tional holdings can only result from constitutional adjudication, it fol-
lows that preemption decisions are instances of constitutional
adjudication. This is a definitional relationship; the standard model's
structure depends on it, as does the internal legitimacy of judicial con-
stitutional analysis. Indeed, if the structure of preemption decisions
were not reconcilable with the standard model, but preemption hold-
ings were unquestionably constitutional, we would just have to recog-
nize another form of constitutional adjudication.
After arguing that the central decisional rule applied in preemp-
tion decisions is not itself distinguishable from other constitutional
adjudicative rules, I turn to step one of the standard model. To ex-
plain why constitutional interpretation appears utterly absent from
preemption decisions, I argue that the pertinent constitutional norms
are underenforced in preemption cases. Congress, not the Court,
bears the primary responsibility for interpreting the nature and scope
of the Constitution's grant of preemptive authority. This conclusion
meshes well with the fact that the operative adjudicative rule in pre-
emption cases resembles a rule of deference to congressional judg-
ment. As a criterion of correctness for this preliminary discussion, I
think that if my suggestion turns out to be useful in describing the
judicial practice in deciding preemption questions, there will be rea-
son to believe that it comes close to the mark.
A. Preemption Holdings as Constitutional Holdings
We might designate certain judicial holdings as constitutional
holdings (as we did with the dormancy decisions) because they follow
after recognizable instances of the other steps in the standard model.
That avenue is of course unavailable for modern preemption holdings.
But even when the process of adjudicating a particular issue is dis-
tinct, if the resulting holding can be shown to be a constitutional hold-
ing, then the legal principles and adjudicative rules applied must be
constitutional. The task then is to explain why the anomalous princi-
ples and rules are nevertheless constitutional, and to reconcile them
with the standard model. I propose to do this for the principles and
rules applied in preemption decisions.
To begin, I will concentrate on another aspect of what makes cer-
tain judicial holdings constitutional-their legal effect. Continuing
with Professor Berman's version of the standard model, a constitu-
tional holding is "quintessentially, a declaration that challenged gov-
ernmental conduct is, or is not, constitutionally permissible."1o3
Where the declaration is one of impermissibility, the legal effect is to
103. Berman, supra note 30, at 38.
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render the challenged conduct null and void.104 If the legal effect of a
holding (e.g., to nullify a certain type of conduct) can only be the result
of the operation of the constitution (its legal force or effect), then it
must be a constitutional holding.
The different types of preemption are well catalogued else-
where.10 5 On the one hand, there are the impossibility decisions,
which result in nullification of one particular application of state
law.10 6 At the other end of the spectrum are field preemption deci-
sions, which both invalidate the state law and strip away large areas
of state regulatory jurisdiction, even absent any conflict between state
and federal law.10 7 Field preemption is said to occur where "[tihe
scheme of federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it," or where "the Act of Congress . . .touch[es] a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be as-
sumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."10 8
Where Congress has expressly or impliedly preempted a regulatory
field, even state laws perfectly harmonious with the federal scheme
are nullified, as the states are taken to have no regulatory jurisdiction
at all.109 Between these two extremes lies the majority of modern pre-
emption decisions, where state law is displaced for varying degrees of
conflict with federal law or for varying degrees of intentional congres-
sional displacement of state regulatory jurisdiction.110 The holding of
Lorillard, for example, had both effects."'1
In short, preemption holdings are declarations of the permissibility
of either validly enacted state laws or the existence of state regulatory
jurisdiction-often both. The legal effect of a preemption holding is to
104. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("[S]ince our deci-
sion in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 [(1819)], it has been
settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without effect.'"); Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982) ("Of course, a state statute is void to the
extent that it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute .... "); Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974) (preemption is a question of whether
the state law is "void under the Supremacy clause").
105. See generally Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085,
2098-112 (2000); Pursley, supra note 63, at 385-91; Nelson, supra note 64;
Young, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 1377-80.
106. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
107. See Dinh, supra note 105, at 2098-112; Nelson, supra note 64; Pursley, supra
note 63, at 385-91.
108. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
109. See Dinh, supra note 105, at 2105.
110. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
111. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001) (holding that Massa-
chusetts's "outdoor and point-of-sale advertising regulations targeting cigarettes
are pre-empted by the FCLAA" and that "the FCLAA prevents States and locali-
ties from imposing special requirements or prohibitions 'based on smoking and
health' 'with respect to the advertising or promotion' of cigarettes").
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render the challenged state law or area of state regulatory jurisdiction
null and void. 112 Courts and commentators may understand such
holdings to be, at bottom, constitutional holdings, but the reasons for
that understanding are seldom explained.113 By focusing on what it
means for a judicial decision to invalidate a state law or strip state
regulatory jurisdiction, I want to show that preemption holdings can
only be constitutional holdings. To see why, return for a moment to
first principles.
The states "entered the Union 'with their sovereignty intact'";114
they surrendered aspects of that sovereignty to constitute the national
government.115 This surrender was voluntary: "Each State, in ratify-
ing the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of
all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act."116 The no-
tion that constitutional requirements must at times override state
sovereign prerogatives, then, is consistent with the principle, central
to any persuasive theory of sovereignty, that the acts of a sovereign
government may only be undone with the consent of the sovereign it-
self."17 The limitations on state sovereignty reflected in the Constitu-
tion are what the states agreed to at ratification. But as Madison
explained, "[TIhe States... retain, under the proposed Constitution, a
very extensive portion of active sovereignty . . . ."118 The Tenth
112. Professor Gardbaum traces these legal effects to distinct constitutional princi-
ples: the Supremacy Clause for the invalidation of the state law as applied on
impossibility grounds; the Necessary and Proper Clause for the invalidation of
the state law and state regulatory jurisdiction, where there is no conflict, on con-
gressional-intent grounds. He calls these effects "supremacy" and "preemption,"
respectively. See Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 770-73. Professor Young would
no doubt characterize the invalidation of validly enacted state laws as effecting
state sovereignty, and the displacement of state regulatory authority as effecting
state autonomy. See generally Young, Federalisms, supra note 12. Young notes,
however, that the sovereignty/autonomy distinction is malleable: "Autonomy can-
not long be preserved without some form of sovereignty, and sovereignty is point-
less without autonomy." Id. at 160. Both distinctions are logically subsequent to
the question I am addressing here.
113. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 8.
114. Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S. Car. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002)
(quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
115. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin
Books 1987) (explaining that the powers of the national government were "trans-
ferred" from the state governments).
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 257 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin
Books 1987).
117. Id.; see also Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State
Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1551, 1554 (2003).
118. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293-94 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Pen-
guin 1987). See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
549 (1985) ("The states unquestionably do 'retain a significant measure of sover-
eign authority[,]"... to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of
their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.");
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Amendment reflects the "truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered[,]"' 19 that "what is not conferred, is withheld, and
belongs to the state authorities."120 This is the dual sovereignty that
federalism, broadly conceived, is intended to maintain. 12 1
Although the structural principles of federalism are not easily
translated into rules of judicial decision, 12 2 there are acknowledged
outer limits to the continuum of actions permissible within the struc-
ture. For instance, we know that congressional control of state execu-
tive officials is out of bounds.12 3 Another limitation derives from the
fact that the states retained their legislative independence after ratifi-
cation. The idea of continuing state legislative independence is not
controversial: if the notion that the retained sovereignty of the states
is popular sovereignty means anything at all,124 it must at least mean
that the prerogatives of state citizens, expressed through their legisla-
Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868) (stating that even after
joining the Union, "the people of each State compose a State, having its own gov-
ernment, and endowed with all the functions necessary to separate and indepen-
dent existence"); Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819)
("[Ilt was neither necessary nor proper to define the powers retained by the
States. These powers proceed, not from the people of America, but from the peo-
ple of the several States; and remain, after the adoption of the constitution, what
they were before, except so far as they may be abridged by that instrument.").
119. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
120. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 752
(1833).
121. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
122. See FALLON, supra note 38, at 98; see generally Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Ques-
tion in Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 664-81 (1993).
123. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933-34 (1997). Of course Congress
may prohibit state government officials from violating the Constitution. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing a private right of action for constitutional vio-
lations by state officials). But this is no intrusion on state authority, which never
included authority to violate the Constitution.
124. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 297 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Pen-
guin Books 1987) ("The federal and State governments are in fact but different
agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and de-
signed for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have
lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have
viewed these different establishments not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but
as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities
of each other. These gentlemen . . .must be told that the ultimate authority,
wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone . . . ."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books
1987) ("In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the peo-
ple is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allot-
ted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control
each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself." (emphasis
added)); Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425,
1448-51 (1987).
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tures, are not always, or even often, subject to external override. 125
Apparently serving this principle, the Framers rejected the New
Jersey Plan, which proposed that Congress be empowered to act di-
rectly on state governments as it had been under the Articles of Con-
federation, 126 and instead "extend[ed] the authority of the Union to
the persons of the citizens-the only proper objects of government."127
Indeed, in comparing each government's capacity to resist encroach-
ment by the other, Madison observed that the national government
would be at a decided disadvantage because of continuing state legis-
lative independence: "If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly
to the national government, be generally popular in that State ... it is
executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and de-
pending on the State alone."128
Not surprisingly, the Madisonian theory of vertical separation of
powers, 129 which engenders the political process protections for feder-
alism,130 depends on continuing state legislative independence. On
Madison's view, the states' command of the popular loyalty, a princi-
pal bulwark against national encroachment, would persist in large
part because "[b]y the superintending care of [the state governments],
all the more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regu-
lated and provided for."13 1 The states' capacity to retain popular alle-
giance by providing regulatory benefits to their citizens would be
undermined, of course, if state legislative decisions were regularly
subject to federal override.132 The modern Supreme Court reaffirmed
these principles in New York v. United States when it held that Con-
125. I am not arguing for "dual federalism," which has been fairly conclusively de-
bunked. See Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal"
Decisions: A Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 877 (1985) (rec-
ognizing the general rejection of the view that "recognition of power in one sover-
eign inherently implies an absence of concurrent power in the other sovereign.");
Young, Federalisms, supra note 12, at 104-05. There are few if any "spheres" of
regulatory jurisdiction exclusively committed to either the federal or state gov-
ernments. There are instead vast swaths of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction.
See Nelson, supra note 64, at 225; see generally Young, supra note 23. Legislative
independence is the state legislatures' freedom to act without federal control.
126. 1 M. FERRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (1911).
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Pen-
guin Books 1987). Indeed, Hamilton explained that "[tihe great and radical vice
in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLA-
TION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE
CAPACITIES, and as contra-distinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom
they consist." Id. at 147.
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 124, at 299-300.
129. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 46, 51 (James Madison).
130. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
131. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 124, at 297.
132. See Young, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 1355-60; see also THE FEDERALIST No.
51 (James Madison). This is one of Professor Young's most important arguments
in favor of greater limitations on preemption.
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gress cannot, even by otherwise legitimate exercises of its enumerated
powers, "commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by di-
rectly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory pro-
gram."1 3 3 The Court based its conclusion on the observation that "the
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the
ability to require the States to govern according to Congress'
instructions."13 4
Imagine that there was no constitutional grant of preemptive au-
thority to Congress. In that case, preemption, in either of its legal
effects, would clearly run afoul of the principle of continuing state leg-
islative independence. Congressional nullification of validly enacted
state statutes overrides the will of the state citizenry, undermining
the popular sovereignty of the states. And, even more telling, Con-
gressional stripping of state regulatory jurisdiction coerces state legis-
lative forbearance. Indeed, most express preemption provisions are
phrased just this way. For example, the Airline Deregulation Act pro-
vides that "a State ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or
other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price,
route, or service of an air carrier."13 5 So, too, the Clean Air Act pro-
vides that "[n]o state . . . shall adopt or attempt to enforce any stan-
dard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines."13 6 Such coercion undermines state popu-
lar sovereignty and, ceteris paribus, contravenes the rule of New York,
which is designed to preserve state legislative independence. I do not
think it matters that preemptive federal statutes, formally speaking,
operate on individuals rather than state governments. The effect is
the same as if the statutes were expressly directed at state legisla-
tures. Of course, preemption's two possible effects differ by degree of
interference. While invalidating a state law as applied in an impossi-
bility case overrides a single instance of state popular choice, stripping
state regulatory jurisdiction imposes a durable, temporally extended
constraint on the state's polity.137
Nevertheless, New York makes clear the enumerated powers alone
do not grant Congress the authority to abrogate state legislative inde-
pendence. Thus, preemption's effects cannot fairly be attributed to
the naked legal force of federal legislation validly enacted pursuant to
the enumerated powers. 138 State legislative independence may only
133. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
134. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992).
135. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2000).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000).
137. This point is particularly pertinent to the discussion infra section III.C.
138. This conclusion eliminates one possible implication of the Court's cryptic state-
ment in Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 224-25 (1845), that "[elvery
constitutional act of Congress... becomes the supreme law of the land, and oper-
ates by its own force on the subject-matter, in whatever state or territory it may
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be overridden pursuant to the state consents reflected in the Constitu-
tion. It follows that preemption may only be accomplished by the legal
force of the constitution itself. Consistent with this view, the Court in
New York described preemption as a constitutionally enshrined excep-
tion to the rule against federal interference with state legislative inde-
pendence, rather than as an effect somehow entailed by the nature of
federal legislation itself and thus beyond the reach of conceptual limi-
tations like the rule of New York. 139 It is the operative constitutional
provision reflecting the states' consent to abrogation of their legisla-
tive independence that confers Congress's preemptive authority.14 0
Constitutional, rather than congressional, mediation of conflicts
between federal and state regulatory authority is consistent with the
Framers' view that, "in controversies relating to the boundary be-
tween the two jurisdictions ... the decision is to be impartially made,
according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most
effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality."141 This
calls into question the idea that the line between federal and state
regulatory jurisdiction was entrusted entirely to the political pro-
cess.' 42 Impartial constitutional mediation suggests judicial re-
view. 143 And while the proper scope of judicial review of preemption
depends in part on the textual source of preemptive authority, which
is a matter of some dispute,144 my claim does not require settling that
happen to be." This cannot mean that federal statutes, of their own force, accom-
plish preemption. Rather, it must be read for the more limited proposition that
when courts must choose between otherwise applicable, but contrary, federal and
state laws, the federal statute prevails.
139. New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68.
140. There are additional reasons, beyond the holding of New York, to conclude that
the pertinent constitutional provision cannot be the enumerated powers them-
selves, which I explain below. See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
141. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 116, at 258.
142. For a seminal presentation of the process view, generally see JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECON-
SIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980). See also Hoke,
Supremacy, supra note 2, at 868-69 (arguing that the addition of the Supremacy
Clause "shifted from the legislative branch to the judiciary the responsibility for
... securing state fidelity to national law," which "guaranteed [the states] that,
first, they would have a forum in which to defend their laws," contrary to the view
that the political process provides sufficient protection); Young, Two Cheers,
supra note 12, at 1350-51 (explaining that "the debate has generally been over
whether we should have any judicial review or none at all; between total reliance
on the political process to protect federalism or anything short of that" (emphasis
omitted)).
143. See FALLON, supra note 38, at 130-31 ("Congress is... an interested party, and
the desirability of judicial review . . . plain, when a statute is challenged as ex-
ceeding the scope of federal legislative authority or as threatening the structur-
ally grounded prerogatives of the states.").
144. Compare Nelson, supra note 64, at 234 ("As the Supreme Court and virtually all
commentators have acknowledged, the Supremacy Clause is the reason that valid
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question. The point to take away is this: Because preemption can only
be accomplished by the legal force of the Constitution, any legitimate
judicial holding that state law is preempted is necessarily a constitu-
tional holding-"a declaration that challenged [state law] ... is not[ ]
constitutionally permissible."14 5 It follows that preemption decisions
must be instances of constitutional adjudication.146
Having concluded that preemption holdings are necessarily consti-
tutional, and thus that preemption decisions must be instances of con-
stitutional adjudication, I discuss in the next two sections a way to
reconcile the form of preemption decisions with the standard model of
constitutional adjudication.
B. Mediating Adjudicative Rules
The conclusion that preemption holdings must be constitutional
holdings brings us back to the initial question: Why do preemption
decisions look different than other standard-model constitutional deci-
sions if they are, in fact, instances of constitutional adjudication? To
get at the answer, we should begin by reviewing our understanding of
the rules of decision applied in constitutional cases.
Recall Professor Fallon's view that constitutional adjudication is a
process of constitutional "implementation."14 7 He uses "implementa-
tion" rather than "interpretation" to encompass "two conceptually dis-
tinctive functions: one of identifying constitutional norms and
specifying their meaning and another of crafting doctrine or develop-
ing standards of review."148 The Court creates doctrines or standards
of review-what I have been calling constitutional "rules"-to enforce
constitutional meanings or norms, which are often themselves too ab-
stract to effectively mediate actual disputes.149 In creating constitu-
tional rules, the Court takes into account the practicalities of
implementation: institutional capacity, efficiency, costs, and the de-
federal statutes trump state law." (citations omitted)), with Gardbaum, supra
note 15, at 773-77, 782 ("There is ... a straightforward plausibility behind ulti-
mately deriving preemption from Congress's enumerated power under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause." (citations omitted)).
145. Berman, supra note 30, at 38.
146. Another implication of this understanding, which is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, is that preemption is only justifiable as a doctrine of constitutional law. To
the extent that any of the forms of preemption cannot be rooted in the constitu-
tion, those forms are illegitimate. This observation adds a bit of conceptual bite
to arguments that obstacle preemption, for example, is illegitimate because it is
not rooted in the constitutional text. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 64, at 265-74.
147. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
148. FALLON, supra note 38, at 38.
149. See id. at 42.
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sire for decisional accuracy, among other things. 15o The rules, while
not always obviously derivable from the constitutional norms they en-
force, are nevertheless directly tied to those norms. Without the
norm, the rule would have nothing to enforce, and, ex hypothesi, no
legitimate reason to exist. Without the rule, the norm would lack a
feasible mechanism of enforcement. 15 1 The question is: Are there any
such rules to be found in preemption decisions?
At first blush, the prospects do not look good. The Supreme Court
itself has recognized that no clear constitutional rules have been spec-
ified in preemption decisions:
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of... federal
laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions:
conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcil-
ability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of
these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive con-
stitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear
distinctly marked formula.
1 5 2
It seems that the Court views the constitutional part of the preemp-
tion inquiry as proceeding on an essentially ad hoc basis. That it ap-
pears so should not be surprising; as has been repeatedly observed,
preemption decisions appear to be all about statutory construction,
and different statutes require different rules and forms of analysis. 15 3
But appearances can be deceiving.
To be sure, the Court has applied a number of rules of statutory
construction in preemption cases, including, for example, the rule that
absent ambiguity courts give effect to the plain language of a stat-
ute; 154 the rule that where "judicial interpretations have settled the
meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same lan-
guage in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to
150. See Berman, supra note 30, at 92-100; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manage-
able Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HAav. L. REV. 1275, 1287-93,
1309-13 (2006).
151. See Sager, supra note 33, at 1213-14 (explaining the "difference between the
meaning of a normative precept [a 'concept'] and the application of that precept
through the modeling of a theory or structure of analysis [a 'conception']" and
stating that "the concept governs the conception, for the very purpose of the con-
ception is the realization or understanding of the concept").
152. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (citations omitted), quoted in Penn-
sylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956).
153. Dinh, supra note 105, at 2092; Ernest A. Young, The Last Brooding Omnipres-
ence: Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins and the Unconstitutionality of Preemptive Fed-
eral Maritime Law, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1349, 1383 (1999); Young, Two Cheers,
supra note 12, at 1383 (noting that preemption decisions, 'while carrying
profound implications for the federal balance, are fundamentally about statutory
interpretation").
154. Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 642 (1990).
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incorporate its . . .judicial interpretations as well";155 the "familiar
principle of expressio[ I unius est exclusio alterius";156 and the rule
that among statutory provisions "the specific governs the general."15 7
And as I noted, the Court in preemption cases has relied on sources of
extrinsic evidence familiar in statutory construction-legislative his-
tory, related statutory provisions, and so forth.158 The central role of
such rules in preemption decisions, for many, suggests a nonconstitu-
tional process of adjudication. 159 But these are not the central deci-
sional rules. They are instead subsidiary to another, more
fundamental rule of decision that is generally applicable in modern
preemption cases. Concentrating on the ubiquity of statutory inter-
pretation rules in preemption decisions mistakes the forest for the
trees.
In modern preemption cases (aside from cases of impossibility6O),
congressional intent is determinative of the outcome. 16 1 Where there
is an express preemption provision in the statute, the existence of pre-
emption generally is clear, but the scope of preemption turns on con-
gressional intent.162 Where there is no preemption provision,
congressional intent determines both the existence and scope of pre-
emption. 163 For courts, the general rule of decision in preemption
cases requires discovering and giving effect to congressional intent:
preemption is legitimate and state law is inapplicable (or invalid, or
state regulatory jurisdiction is foreclosed, or all three) if and to the
extent that Congress intended that it be so. Could this "congressional-
intent rule" be a constitutional rule?
Some of the most recognizable constitutional rules do not resemble
the norms that they implement. For example, the familiar tiers of
155. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1513-14
(2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)).
156. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992).
157. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1992).
158. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
159. E.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Muir, 792 F.2d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 1986)
("[Flederal court[s] should not abstain under Pullman from interpreting a state
law that might be preempted by a federal law, because preemption problems are
resolved through a non-constitutional process of statutory construction."); Dinh,
supra note 105, at 2092.
160. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000); Gade v.
Nat'l Solid Waste Mgt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992); English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Luek, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985);
Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978); see also supra notes
92-97 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 542-48 (2001).
163. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1947).
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scrutiny-rational basis, intermediate, and strict164-do not bear ob-
vious traces of the Fourteenth Amendment's admonition that the
states shall not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."165 And the rule of Miranda rendering inad-
missible statements made during custodial interrogations that are not
preceded by proper warningsi66 bears little resemblance to the Fifth
Amendment's requirement that no person may be "compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."167 So it is not disquali-
fying that the congressional-intent rule does not point us immediately
to the constitutional norm that it implements. We might stop with
this observation, conclude preliminarily that the congressional-intent
rule may be a constitutional rule, and move on to see whether the pre-
emption decisions explain what constitutional norm the rule serves to
implement.
But it is also worth noting that the congressional-intent rule is
similar to other kinds of recognizably constitutional rules, such as "ap-
propriate deliberation tests" that "ask[ I ... whether a challenged stat-
ute or policy resulted from fair or appropriate deliberative
processes."168 For instance, the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger estab-
lished the rule that colleges and universities may consider race in
their admissions processes without violating the Equal Protection
Clause, but only when such consideration goes to a student's capacity
to contribute to diversity in the institution. 69 Of course, in most pre-
emption cases the legitimacy of the federal statute, and thus the pro-
cess of its enactment, is not challenged. But central (though unstated)
questions raised in preemption cases do appear to be whether, if so,
preemption has been legitimately effected and whether preemption is
nevertheless precluded by federalism concerns. By applying only the
congressional-intent rule to determine the holding, courts condition
164. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227-30 (1995) (strict scru-
tiny for racial classifications, benign or not); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 532-33 (1996) (intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications); Bd. of Trs.
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (rational basis review for
classifications based on disability); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at
567-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the tiers of scrutiny).
165. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1; see Planned Parenthood of S. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 930-31 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[T]he Constitution makes no mention of the rational-basis test, or the specific
verbal formulations of intermediate and strict scrutiny by which this Court eval-
uates claims under the Equal Protection Clause." (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 548 (1989)).
166. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
168. FALLON, supra note 38, at 79.
169. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Before Grutter was de-
cided, Fallon similarly offered Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978), as an example of the permissible discontinuity between
norm and rule. See FALLON, supra note 38, at 87.
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preemption's existence (and thus its legitimacy) as well as its scope on
Congress's having engaged in appropriate deliberation on the issue.
The congressional-intent rule also qualifies as what Professor
Young has called a "resistance norm"1 7 0-a "constitutional principle[]
that make[s] it harder, but not impossible, for the government to do
certain things."1 71 Other examples of resistance norms include the
rule that courts should construe statutes to avoid constitutional
doubts, which "makes it harder-but still not impossible-for Con-
gress to write statutes that intrude into areas of constitutional sensi-
tivity,"172 and the presumption against preemption, which forces
Congress to make clear its intent to preempt when legislating in areas
of traditional state authority.173 While the congressional-intent rule
perhaps does not make it as hard for Congress to preempt state law as
does the presumption against preemption, it certainly does place an
obstacle in Congress's path. Save for instances of impossibility, pre-
emption is not an automatic byproduct of the national legislative pro-
cess; Congress must intend preemption alongside the other
substantive effects of the statute. Regardless of its similarities to
other kinds of constitutional rules, the congressional-intent rule ap-
plied in preemption cases requires considerable deference to congres-
sional judgment about when and how much to preempt.
Having identified a potentially constitutional rule at work in pre-
emption cases, I turn now to consider whether the decisions disclose
any interpretation or explanation of the constitutional norm that the
rule implements.
170. See generally Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and
the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000).
171. Young, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 1389.
172. Young, supra note 170, at 1552.
173. See Young, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 1388-89. Professor Young argues that
the application of the presumption against preemption is constitutional review:
[The presumption against preemption] cause[s] a judge to reject the in-
terpretation of a statute she would otherwise prefer, in favor of an inter-
pretation that is less persuasive ceteris paribus, all in favor of some
substantive value that Congress probably never had in mind at all....
[Wlhen a court chooses one statutory interpretation over another
based on constitutional imperatives, that court has engaged in constitu-
tional review.
Id. This may be true, but it does not explain the failure of preemption decisions
in general to fit the standard model. The argument does not account for all pre-
emption decisions since the presumption against preemption is only applied
where the federal statute touches on an area of "traditional state concern." See,
e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The presumption
is inapplicable in express preemption cases, see Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
544 U.S. 431, 457 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
and, ex hypothesi, in cases that do not involve displacement of an area of tradi-
tional state authority.
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C. Statements of Constitutional Meaning
As I said, modern preemption decisions lack any recognizable
statements of constitutional meaning-or instances of judicial work-
ing-out of constitutional meaningl 74-"pure" or otherwise.175 But
again, two constitutional questions, and thus at least two constitu-
tional norms, are implicated in preemption controversies. First, there
is the question of whether Congress has the constitutional authority
to preempt. Second, even if Congress has the constitutional authority,
there is the question of whether preemption is nevertheless precluded
by other constitutional norms. The first question concerns the consti-
tutional norm that authorizes preemption-the "authorizing norm."
The second question could involve a number of constitutional norms
that constrain otherwise legitimate congressional action, but since
preemption decisions implicate federalism in particular, here I simply
will refer to "federalism norms." When courts hold state law void on
preemption grounds, they implicitly conclude that neither of these
norms precludes the result.
The first question is never thoroughly addressed in preemption de-
cisions, the second only rarely. In modern preemption decisions like
Lorillard, the constitutional discussion typically begins and ends with
a brief reference to the Supremacy Clause.17 6 There has been no judi-
cial elaboration of how, exactly, the modern varieties of preemption
are authorized by the Supremacy Clause.177 This is a particularly
thunderous silence considering that express and field preemption, for
example, defy explanation as direct applications or obvious implica-
tions of the clause's plain language.178 The academic dispute over the
textual source of the authorizing norm surely is provoked in part by
the absence of judicial comment on the matter.179 Of course, the ab-
174. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text; Gardbaum, supra note 18, at 803
(explaining that the "standard view" that preemptive authority is founded on the
Supremacy Clause is "asserted peremptorily and without explanation both in
scholarly works and in virtually every modern preemption case decided by the
Supreme Court"); id. at 803 n.28 (collecting cases); see also Hoke, Supremacy,
supra note 2, at 835-53 (arguing that deriving the modern forms of preemption
from the Supremacy Clause involves substantial interpretive complexity).
175. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 3, 76-86 and accompanying text; Hoke, Pathologies, supra note 2,
at 723-28 (comparing "model one" preemption adjudications, in which courts re-
cite the Supremacy Clause and superficially characterize the controversy as a
constitutional question, with other instances in which the question is treated as
essentially nonconstitutional).
177. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text; authorities cited supra note 174;
Hoke, Supremacy, supra note 2, at 835-53; see generally Nelson, supra note 64
(arguing for a reinterpretation of the Supremacy Clause that would alter the va-
rieties of preemption available to Congress).
178. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
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sence of judicial explanation does not rule out the Supremacy Clause
as the source of the authorizing norm (although some commentators
suggest alternative sourcesl 8 0 ). But because the modern Court has
not even hinted that preemption may be attributable to any other con-
stitutional provision, the nature of preemption's authorizing norm re-
mains unexplained.1s1 Nor, aside from indirect references in setting
out the presumption against preemption, i8 2 and a few statements in
concurrence or dissent,i8 3 has the Court thoroughly explained what
restrictions on preemption, if any, are required by federalism
norms.1 8 4 I suggest that the reason for the absence of judicial expla-
nation of these norms is that the norms are systematically under-
enforced in preemption decisions. Recognizing preemption decisions
as instances of judicial underenforcement of constitutional norms rec-
onciles the structure of preemption decisions with the standard model
of constitutional adjudication.
In setting out his underenforcement thesis, Professor Sager first
describes something like the distinction between constitutional inter-
pretation and constitutional rules, referring to "statement[s] which
describe[ I an ideal which is embodied in the Constitution" as con-
cepts, and "statement[s] which attempt[ ] to translate such an ideal
into . . . workable standard[s] for the decision of concrete issues" as
conceptions.' 8 5 He then explains:
In applying the provisions of the Constitution to the challenged behavior of
state or federal officials, the federal courts have modeled analytical structures
["constructs"] .... [Tihe important difference between a true constitutional
conception and the judicially formulated construct is that the judicial con-
struct may be truncated for reasons which are based not upon the analysis of
the constitutional concept but upon various concerns of the Court about its
institutional role. These concerns operate to produce some judicial constructs
which are not at all exhaustive of the constitutional concepts they reflect....
[Wihen this is the case, the construct will let go unchecked some official be-
havior which may well be in conflict with the concept itself.186
180. See generally Gardbaum, supra note 15; Gardbaum, supra note 18 (Necessary
and Proper Clause); Hoke, Supremacy, supra note 2, at 874-75 (suggesting that
preemptive authority arises from "the balance of the Constitution," i.e., federal-
ism principles, rather than the Supremacy Clause).
181. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 21, 173 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 161 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (discussed supra note 91 and accompanying text); Geier v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 887 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This is a case about
federalism...." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Coleman v. Thomp-
son, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991)); see also Young, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at
1380-84 (discussing these and other examples).
184. See Young, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 1377-80 (describing the Court's failure
to address the federalism implications of preemption as a "glaring omission" in
the putative "federalist revival").
185. Sager, supra note 33, at 1213.
186. Id. at 1214-15.
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In short, courts may have nonconstitutional reasons to create consti-
tutional rules that do not invalidate the full spectrum of conduct pro-
hibited by the relevant constitutional norm, fairly understood.187
Underenforcement is not limited conceptually to restrictive norms;
courts may underenforce power-conferring constitutional norms, mu-
tatis mutandis, by enforcing constitutional rules that allow a greater
range of conduct than is authorized by the norm, fairly understood.18 8
However, the critical second part of Sager's argument makes clear
that the full range of obligations imposed by constitutional norms re-
mains binding, even when judicially underenforced:
[C]onsitutional norms which are underenforced by the federal judiciary
should be understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual limits, and
federal judicial decisions which stop short of these limits should be understood
as delineating only the boundaries of the federal courts' role in enforcing the
norm: By "legally valid," I mean that the unenforced margins of under-
enforced norms should have the full status of positive law which we generally
accord to the norms of our Constitution, save only that the federal judiciary
will not enforce these margins. Thus, the legal powers or legal obligations of
government officials which are subtended in the unenforced margins of under-
enforced constitutional norms are to be understood to remain in full force. 1 8 9
Where constitutional norms that confer or constrain congressional au-
thority are judicially underenforced, Congress is nevertheless obli-
gated to ensure compliance with the full conceptual reach of the
norms. The underenforcement thesis describes a "constitutional divi-
187. As I said above, I do not take a position on the pragmatist critique of "pure" con-
stitutional interpretation. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. And, I
do not believe that Sager takes an anti-pragmatist view of constitutional inter-
pretation. In Chapter 5 of his book Justice in Plainclothes, Sager describes a
complex "partnership" between the Framers and the modern judiciary which "is
concerned with bringing rich content and close detail to the general principles
announced in the text." LAwRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THE-
ORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 71 (2004). Sager makes clear that
the job of the modern constitutional interpreter-to make decisions in conformity
with "[t]he requirements of political justice"-is "an exquisitely practical matter"
which involves assessing "the ability or tendency of real-world institutions to
make decisions in conformity with those requirements." Id. I do not believe that
Professor Berman attributes to Sager an anti-pragmatist view. See Berman,
supra note 30, at 50 (classifying Sager as a "taxonomist," in contradistinction to
the pragmatists). Professor Berman may only mean to say that Sager, unlike the
pragmatists, sees the value in distinguishing judicial elaboration of constitu-
tional meaning from the creation of constitutional decisional rules. I agree with
that point. See supra text accompanying note 186.
188. When it comes to the question of substantive limits on congressional power, a
power conferring norm may also be viewed as a limiting norm. This is certainly
true when a power historically treated as plenary is suddenly subjected to sub-
stantive limitations, as was the commerce power in United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995). Power conferring norms are conceptually distinct, in that what
we call substantive limitations on conduct are in fact instances where the norm
simply does not authorize the conduct in the first place.
189. Sager, supra note 33, at 1221.
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sion of labor" between the federal judiciary and other governmental
actors. 190 Underenforcement on the one hand is justified by the value
of judicial observation of meaningful limitations on its institutional
capacity, and on the other by the importance of nonjudicial govern-
mental actors' participation in the enforcement of constitutional obli-
gations.19 1 The promise of this view-a more descriptively accurate
and normatively potent account of our constitutionalism-has
prompted its widespread acceptance. 19 2
Sager focuses on judicial underenforcement of the "liberty bearing"
provisions of the Constitution. 193 One of his examples is the Supreme
Court's decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., where the Court held
that Congress had the constitutional authority to prohibit private ra-
cial discrimination pursuant to Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.19 4 Section 2 empowers Congress to enforce Section 1, which
provides that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereby the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction."195 Instead of attempting to define the scope of the
authority granted under Section 2 by interpreting Section 1, the Court
noted that, in passing the first Civil Rights Act nearly a century
before, Congress had rejected the view that Section 2 "merely author-
ized Congress to dissolve the legal bond by which the . . . slave was
held to his master."196 The Court upheld Congress's authority to act
on subjects other than slavery itself on the ground that, in 1866, "the
majority leaders in Congress-who were, after all, the authors of the
Thirteenth Amendment-had no doubt that its Enabling Clause con-
templated the sort of positive legislation" that was challenged in
Jones. The underenforcement thesis thus both explains and justifies
the Court's decision in Jones. The Thirteenth Amendment was in-
tended to eliminate not only slavery itself, but the "badges and inci-
dents" of slavery. 197 The Court, I think properly, deferred judgment
on appropriate remedial actions to Congress, which is better suited to
make such determinations. 198
190. SAGER, supra note 187, at 102.
191. See id. ("If the judiciary is constrained by durable features of its institutional role
from fully enforcing the Constitution, it follows that we should encourage and
welcome the assistance of other governmental actors in realizing more fully the
Constitution's aims.").
192. See id. at 93.
193. SAGER, supra note 187, at 103. See generally Sager, supra note 33; Lawrence G.
Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional
Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410 (1993).
194. 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see also SAGER, supra note 187, at 105-09 (discussing Jones).
195. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
196. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439.
197. Id. at 441 (referencing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
198. See SAGER, supra note 187, at 105-09.
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Courts surely may underenforce other, non-liberty bearing, consti-
tutional norms as well. The essential features of instances of judicial
underenforcement are (1) a constitutional norm that fairly may be un-
derstood to impose obligations more extensive than those imposed by
the corresponding constitutional rule enforced by the courts, and (2)
some reason or reasons not drawn exclusively from the constitutional
norm itself that justify judicial underenforcement. If I am right that
in preemption decisions the courts do not enforce the authorizing and
federalism norms to their "full conceptual limits,"199 then these basic
requirements for underenforcement must be somewhere present.
Judicial underenforcement of federalism norms in preemption de-
cisions is well recognized, though not necessarily in Sager's terms.
Professor Young argues at length that although the preservation of
state regulatory authority is perhaps the most important requirement
imposed by federalism norms, the Court has eschewed full substantive
enforcement of that requirement in favor of "soft" limitations that re-
inforce Congress's obligation to observe federalism-based require-
ments on its own. 20 0 The Rehnquist Court's sovereign immunity
decisions, which deny Congress the authority to subject state govern-
ments to suit in state court 2 0 1 or in most federal question cases,2 02
demonstrate that substantive federalism constraints are amenable to
judicial enforcement. So, too, do the Court's recent forays into enforc-
ing substantive limits on Congress's commerce power.2 03 But Young,
for one, insists that judicial underenforcement of federalism norms in
preemption cases is justified because Congress, not the judiciary, is
best structured to take account of the state interests effected by pre-
emption. 204 Underenforcement thus appears to explain why federal-
199. Sager, supra note 33, at 1221.
200. Young, Federalisms, supra note 12, at 16-17 (describing the difference between
"hard" and "soft" judicial federalism rules); see id. at 23, 91-99 (discussing the
institutional limitations of the courts); id. at 122-34 (arguing that underenforce-
ment of substantive federalism constraints in preemption cases is justified).
201. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
202. E.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). But cf Cent. Va.
Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006) (abrogation permissible under Bank-
ruptcy Code); United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006) (abrogation occa-
sionally permissible under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
203. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09, 615-18 (2000) (invalidat-
ing the Violence Against Women Act as beyond Congress's commerce power
under the Lopez test); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (con-
cluding that under the Commerce Clause Congress may regulate only "the chan-
nels of interstate commerce," "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons on things in interstate commerce," and "those activities having a sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce").
204. See Young, Federalisms, supra note 12, at 91-99 (describing institutional limita-
tions of courts); id. at 122, 126-34 (describing instances of underenforcement in
preemption and other cases); id. at 132 ("[T]he central aspects of preemption doc-
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ism norms are barely discussed in preemption decisions. 20 5 I believe
that the same holds true for preemption's authorizing norm.
But before proceeding, I want to address a competing view. One
might argue that little or no explanation of preemption's authorizing
norm is necessary because, where congressional action is permissible,
Congress simply possesses plenary authority to preempt state law.
There are two possible bases for such a view.
First, the congressional power of preemption may derive directly
from the enumerated powers-in most instances, the Commerce
Clause. 20 6 On this view, preemption is authorized both wherever Con-
gress is authorized to act and because Congress is authorized to act,
end of story. Even leaving aside its dependence on the questionable
premise that the preemption of state law is, for example, an instance
of the regulation of interstate commerce under the Commerce
Clause,20 7 this idea directly conflicts with the principle of continuing
state legislative independence recognized in New York.208 In short,
this "enumerated powers theory" of preemption proves too much. Re-
call the broad rationale for the holding of New York: Congress may not
abrogate state legislative independence solely by exercising its enu-
merated powers. 20 9 Assuming no other, independent constitutional
authorization for preemption, the enumerated powers view is reconcil-
able with this principle only if we imagine that state legislative inde-
pendence is divisible into halves-an affirmative half representing
states' freedom to enact legislation and a negative half representing
states' freedom to choose not to enact legislation.
This is problematic as a conceptual matter. It just does not make
much sense to say that the enumerated powers cannot abrogate the
negative half on the one hand, but that they abrogate the affirmative
trine rely on process mechanisms-in this case, soft rules of statutory construc-
tion [like the presumption against preemption]-to do their work." (emphasis
omitted)); Young, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 1358-59 ("Congress should be
making the call on governmental action that affects the states-not some admin-
istrative agency or other governmental institution in which the states have virtu-
ally no voice. . . . [T]he more we shift governmental authority away from
Congress to the federal Executive and Judicial branches, the less meaningful the
states' representation in Congress becomes.").
205. This is not to say that federalism norms are not implemented in preemption deci-
sions. The presumption against preemption, applied where the putatively pre-
emptive federal statute touches on an area of "traditional" state authority, is
grounded in federalism concerns. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
206. See Gardbaum, supra note 18, at 805 (noting this as a possible alternative to the
Supremacy Clause). But see id. at 805 n.34 (indicating that there are no serious
advocates of this position).
207. See id. at 805.
208. See supra notes 122-34 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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half automatically on the other.2 10 And this distinction is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the fact, emphasized in New York, that the
Constitution was structured to preserve state legislative indepen-
dence against bare exercises of the enumerated powers. That protec-
tion would be of little significance on the enumerated powers account
of preemption since the power to coerce state legislative forbearance
alone could quite easily subvert state legislative independence en-
tirely. States could, after all, be left with all the affirmative legislative
independence in the world to no useful end without any permissible
regulatory jurisdiction. 2 1 1 In fact, it is easier and less costly for Con-
gress to coerce state legislative forbearance, since the implied- and
field-preemption doctrines obviate the need to do so expressly. If Pro-
fessor Young is correct that protecting state regulatory authority is
federalism's central concern,2 12 New York would fail utterly in its goal
of recognizing a meaningful federalism-based limitation on the enu-
merated powers, if it left intact, inherent in those same powers, the
congressional authority to force state legislatures to refrain from act-
ing altogether.
But to conclude that the power to preempt is not inherent in the
enumerated powers does not eliminate the possibility that it may be
coextensive with the enumerated powers. It merely shows that the two
kinds of powers cannot be coextensive in virtue of the fact that they
are identical. This leads to the second possible basis for the view that
Congress possesses unlimited preemptive power-the idea that some
constitutional norm simply augments exercises of the enumerated
powers to "add" an automatic preemptive effect. On this view, pre-
emptive force is a constitutionally imbued characteristic of all federal
210. I will not dwell on it, but talk of "automatic" preemption again calls to mind the
long since rejected "dual federalism" concept-one of the proverbial mischievous
leprechauns of constitutional theory. See Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 801-07
(describing the rejection of "automatic" preemption in the 1930s); see also supra
note 125 and accompanying text (discussing rejection of the dual federalism
concept).
211. Professor Young makes a similar argument to support his view that limiting pre-
emption is more important for federalism than protecting state sovereign
immunity:
State sovereign immunity limits the national government's ability to
subject states to national policy, but it does little to protect states' ability
to enact and implement policies of their own. The key to state autonomy
lies in the ability to regulate the vast majority of human activity carried
on by private individuals and entities; sovereign immunity has the ef-
fect-at most-of excepting state institutions from themselves being the
objects of regulation. One can imagine, at the extreme, a state govern-
ment which was perfectly exempt from all federal requirements but
which had been left with nothing at all to do.
Young, Federalisms, supra note 12, at 154-55.
212. See generally Young, Two Cheers, supra note 12.
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legislation.2 13 That being so, the argument runs, the judicial business
in preemption cases is properly limited to determining whether and to
what extent Congress has exercised this conceded authority. 2 14
This is obviously correct for impossibility preemption: The plain
language of the Supremacy Clause requires that valid federal statute
always will prevail against an otherwise applicable state law where a
court must choose one or the other.2 15 For the other varieties of pre-
emption, however, the lack of consensus on the source of the authoriz-
ing norm means that arguments for the plenary power view must be
based on circumstantial evidence. The courts' interpretive silence in
preemption decisions alone does not provide a reason for accepting the
plenary power view in particular, since the gap is explained just as
well by my underenforcement proposal. One might think it telling,
empirically, that the Court has never declined to find preemption on
the ground that Congress lacked preemptive authority. But as
against the underenforcement thesis, the selection bias of this conten-
tion is obvious. If preemption norms are underenforced, then judicial
decisions are not the place to look for the enforcement of limitations on
the authorizing norm. The underenforcement view predicts judicial
silence on the matter. The substantive limits on preemption are en-
forced upstream, by Congress or other nonjudicial actors, to the extent
they are enforced at all.
Nor is a plenary power of preemption a necessary feature of the
government's federal structure. To be sure, Congress must have the
authority to provide for uniform regulation of subjects that are na-
tional in scope 2 16 and thus to minimize state governmental interfer-
ence. But preemption is not the only means to foster uniformity.
While preemption might be more efficient, there is little doubt that
Congress could achieve the same results, for example, through the ex-
ercise of its recognized authority to place conditions on federal funding
213. Most often, the Supremacy Clause is cited for the authorizing norm in this view.
An example is Professor Hoke's "switch" conception of the Supremacy Clause.
See Hoke, Supremacy, supra note 2, at 879-84. On this view the clause provides
a rule of decision where the question is whether state or federal law should pre-
vail, and that exhausts the clause's substance. See id. at 882 ("[The [Supremacy]
Clause constitutes the means by which all federal rights become enforceable law
and assume priority over any contrary state law.").
214. See Gardbaum, supra note 15, at 767 (paraphrasing the traditional view: "It is
'well established' that Congress has the power to preempt state law in a given
area. The only issue in preemption cases is whether Congress has in fact exer-
cised this undoubted power." (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Res.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983))); Nelson, supra note 64, at 265-90; see gener-
ally Hoke, Supremacy, supra note 2.
215. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text. When this kind of logical conflict
occurs, no one has suggested any rule other than the rule that federal law
prevails.
216. See Gardbaum, supra note 18, at 806-07.
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for state programs in combination with a more limited power to pre-
empt.21 7 Efficiency is not an argument for the existence of plenary
power, of course. It is instead a reason that courts might underenforce
the limitations on Congress's preemptive authority.218
The plenary power view also appears to me inconsistent with his-
tory and the constitutional structure. I have already argued that the
enumerated powers cannot be the source of preemption's authorizing
norm in light of the principle of continuing state legislative indepen-
dence. 219 I think that the implications of that principle are broader
still and bear on this discussion. If the states would not consent to
enumerated powers that automatically abrogate their legislative inde-
pendence, then it is fair to think that they would not have consented
to a separate constitutional provision intended to provide Congress
with plenary preemptive authority, which would have the same ef-
fect.2 20 In fact, the Framers explicitly rejected a proposal to give Con-
gress unlimited authority to veto state legislative enactments, 2 21 and
that was just the fight to protect enacted state law. States no doubt
would have been even more troubled by the prospect, at least partially
realized in modern preemption decisions, that Congress also would
have given plenary authority to strip state regulatory jurisdiction.
But this concern, too, appears to have been addressed by the Framers
217. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (noting that use of the Con-
gressional "spending power to encourage uniformity in the States' drinking ages
... [is] within constitutional bounds"); see also New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 166-67 (listing conditional spending as a means available to Congress
to "urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests").
While this carrot-and-stick approach is not far from coercion, it leaves intact the
freedom of choice of state citizens. This is important conceptually, even if that
choice is not always "free" as a practical matter.
218. See SAGER, supra note 187, at 86-88 (discussing strategic reasons why courts
might underenforce the right to minimum welfare: 'Consider just one component
of the right to minimum welfare: minimally adequate medical care .... What
level of medical care is minimally adequate? How should such care be provided-
by general financial support, single payer or managed competition insurance,
medical vouchers or clinics for the poor? What level or levels of government
should be responsible for design, oversight, and support of the program? How
should the financial burden of such a program be distributed, and how should the
distribution of this burden be implemented?"); Berman, supra note 30, at 92-100
(efficiency considerations are important in shaping constitutional rules); supra
notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
221. This was Madison's proposal, but was not ultimately part of the Virginia Plan.
See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-75 (2004); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 18 (Max Farrand ed., 1966); Hoke, Supremacy, supra note 2, at
864-65, 874-75; Mark R. Killenbeck, Pursuing the Great Experiment: Reserved
Powers in a Post-Ratification, Compound Republic, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 81,
101-04.
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when they refused to empower the national government to act directly
on the state governments. 2 2 2
For all these reasons, I find a plenary power of preemption implau-
sible. I do not mean this to be a comprehensive rebuttal of the plenary
power account of preemption. That is a large project best left for fu-
ture work. I only want to suggest, based on these observations, that
the existence of some substantive limitation on Congress's preemptive
authority is more plausible than not. But if Congress's authority to
preempt is not plenary, what are its limitations? They depend upon
the textual source of preemption's authorizing norm. Let me sketch
some possibilities.
Conventional wisdom locates preemption's authorizing norm in the
Supremacy Clause, so we should begin there. 2 2 3 The phrase "to the
contrary" in the clause could be interpreted to require more direct
forms of conflict than are required in modern preemption cases. Pro-
fessor Hoke suggests that the "to the contrary" language requires judi-
cial construction in preemption decisions.224 Relying on framing-era
sources, she proposes, for example, that "for a state law to be held
contrary to federal law, the state law must evince a hostility toward or
antagonistic effects on the federal goals."2 25 This would preclude, for
example, field preemption226 or preemption based on interference
with Congress's goals, 2 2 7 absent actual antagonism or hostility. Alter-
natively, Professor Gardbaum argues that preemption's authorizing
norm is derived from the Necessary and Proper Clause. 2 28 Emphasiz-
ing the textual requirement of "propriety," he contends that courts in
preemption cases should determine whether "Congress reasonably
conclude [d] not only that national regulation is called for, but also uni-
form national regulation."229 Only if both requirements are satisfied,
222. Again, this was the structure proposed in the New Jersey Plan. See supra notes
125-27 and accompanying text.
223. The prevailing view is often grounded on Marshall's statement in Gibbons that
'acts of the State legislatures [which] interfere with, or are contrary to the valid
laws of Congress," are invalid under the Supremacy Clause. Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). See also Hoke, Pathologies, supra note 2, at 724
& n.181.
224. See Hoke, Supremacy, supra note 2, at 888-89.
225. Id. at 852-53.
226. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
227. See supra text accompanying note 95.
228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see Gardbaum, supra note 18, at 819-20.
229. See Gardbaum, supra note 18, at 819-31 (emphasis omitted). Gardbaum bases
the independent propriety requirement on Marshall's famous exposition of the
Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland: "Let the end be legiti-
mate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are ap-
propriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). According to Gardbaum, the second half of this state-
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on this view, is nullification of state regulatory authority "proper" and
thus constitutionally authorized.
I part ways with these commentators when they suggest that their
proposed limitations on preemptive authority call for doctrinal revi-
sion to enable judicial enforcement. Whatever the limitations, I think
that there are good reasons that those limitations should not be fully
enforced by the judiciary. If the two examples I provided resemble the
actual limitations, it is easy to see what those reasons are. The pro-
posed Supremacy Clause question is whether state enactments dis-
play antagonism toward federal statutory schemes, or, perhaps,
whether as yet nonexistent state legislation will likely turn out to be
antagonistic to federal plans. The proposed Necessary and Proper
Clause question is whether a particular area is best governed by uni-
form national regulation. These are the sort of complex policy ques-
tions (and, indeed, policy predictions) that the judiciary is ill-suited to
resolve. 2 30 Even judicial review of the reasonableness of Congress's
decisions on such matters would be of dubious validity.231 Rules of
deference likely would end up doing most of the work, subtly loosening
the standard from reasonableness to rationality.232 Indeed, the in-
ability of courts to successfully resolve such questions, for Professor
Young, is one thing that justifies judicial underenforcement of federal-
ism norms in preemption cases. 233 And given the centrality of com-
plex federal statutes in preemption decisions, enforcement of
ment (the "letter and spirit" language) incorporates federalism considerations
into the inquiry. See Gardbaum, supra note 18, at 822-28.
230. See Fallon, supra note 150, at 1290-92 (discussing "concerns about judicial capac-
ity to grasp pertinent facts and assess the likely consequences of alternative poli-
cies"); id. at 1299-303 (giving examples of judicial institutional competence gaps
that justify underenforcement); Sager, supra note 33, at 1217-18 (noting that
underenforcement is justifiable where courts cannot derive "workable
standards").
231. Professor Fallon notes that deferential standards are a common guise for
underenforcement:
[Wlhen the Court pronounces that it must give "deference" to the judg-
ments of military authorities or prison officials ... its conclusion is not
that the Constitution, within broad bounds, "means" whatever such offi-
cials say that it means. Nor is it that constitutional guarantees have
little meaning in some contexts. The Court's judgment, rather, is that it
is not well equipped to pronounce independently on what, precisely, the
Constitution means or requires in certain environments and that it
should, accordingly, apply a deferential standard of review. In cases
such as this, deferential standards of review do not give conscientious
officials a license to behave as they choose. Rather, such standards
share responsibility for specifying and implementing constitutional
norms among courts and other officials.
FALLON, supra note 38, at 40-41.
232. I make this point to respond to Professor Gardbaum's suggestion that courts un-
dertake just this inquiry. See Gardbaum, supra note 18, at 823-28.
233. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
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constitutional limitations on preemption almost always will involve
such policy considerations.
Additionally, as Professor Fallon points out, underenforcement al-
lows the Court to avoid normative questions on which a consensus is
not in the offing. "Submersion" of controlling normative controversies
in constitutional decisions may provide "a second-best way of imple-
menting the Constitution under circumstances of reasonable disagree-
ment."2 3 4  Such submersion may be particularly desirable in
preemption cases in light of the unresolved and complex normative
questions involved.
So we have found in preemption decisions the two conditions for
judicial underenforcement: constitutional norms with potentially
more extensive requirements than are enforced by the congressional-
intent rule and reasons why courts might decline to enforce those re-
quirements to the fullest, which reasons are based on institutional
considerations rather than the substance of the norms themselves. I
want to set aside for a companion essay the questions of the specific
source of preemption's authorizing norm, the apparent reasons for its
judicial underenforcement, and the justifiability of that underenforce-
ment. These are complex questions that require more lengthy treat-
ment. Notably, regardless of the specifics, the congressional-intent
rule applied in preemption cases seems particularly appropriate. It
complements judicial underenforcement by reinforcing Congress's re-
sponsibility to focus on the normative prerequisites for preemption in
the first instance. 23 5
The underenforcement thesis reconciles preemption decisions with
the standard model of constitutional adjudication because instances of
underenforcement constitute a variation of the standard model's re-
quirement of an explicit judicial statement of constitutional meaning.
As Professor Fallon explains:
If doctrinal tests are framed to protect or implement constitutional norms, it
might be thought that the Court's reasoning would typically proceed in a two-
stage sequence, with an inquiry into meaning coming first, followed by a sepa-
rate process in which a test is formulated. In fact, it often may happen that
agreement on a doctrinal test comes first and thus forestalls further inquiry
into how, precisely, underlying constitutional norms would best be specified.
If, for example, the Court determines that the equal protection norm is ade-
quately protected in most cases by a rational basis test, and that the legisla-
tion challenged in a particular case survives that test, the Court will have no
234. FALLON, supra note 38, at 109-10.
235. Without such reinforcement, judicial deference might be inappropriate:
[E]ven in cases involving challenges to statutes, the legislature often will
not have addressed the precise issue framed for the Court .... As a
result, there typically will be no plausible argument that the Court
should defer to the reasoned constitutional judgment of a decision maker
with a strong democratic mandate.
Id. at 52.
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occasion to specify what, exactly, the underlying norm of equal protection
means or requires .... [Dloctrinal tests always reflect the meaning of consti-
tutional norms, but do not always directly embody them .... [T]he process of
specification often need go no further than is minimally necessary for agree-
ment on a doctrinal formula.
2 3 6
The underenforcement decision Fallon describes is quintessentially
interpretive. The Court makes a strategic choice not to enforce its
own interpretation of the text in order to obtain the best interpretive
outcome overall. 23 7 In preemption decisions, the choice is based on
the Court's estimation that its own interpretation is not likely to be as
right, as often, as that of Congress 238 and that the congressional-in-
tent rule sufficiently constrains Congress's interpretive freedom to
maintain fidelity to the constitutional norm.239
In fact, Congress may not be the only pertinent nonjudicial actor.
State governments may also have obligations imposed by the constitu-
tional norms governing preemption. 24 0 If, for example, the authoriz-
ing norm requires preemption in cases of state law antagonism toward
federal regulatory schemes, then states may have corresponding obli-
gations not to pass antagonistic laws. And in any event, even if the
norms do not impose obligations directly on the state governments,
states certainly may play a role in interpreting Congress's obligations
under those norms. State legislatures surely consider the possibility
of preemption before enacting laws and just as surely try to craft their
enactments to avoid preemption where possible. State strategies in
this regard may reflect a consensus as to what should and should not
be preemptable. I think that the project of discerning a "legislative
236. Id. at 38-39.
237. Criteria for the "best interpretive outcome" may vary. For Sager, the best inter-
pretive outcome is the one most conducive to political justice. See SAGER, supra
note 187, at 84-85 ("Justice-seeking theorists have the burden of explaining why
the Constitution is so thin, why it stops so far short of justice if justice is its
target."). For Professor Young, it likely would be that which best balances state
and federal interests. See generally Young, Federalisms, supra note 12.
238. See FALLON, supra note 38, at 51; Berman, supra note 30, at 93-94 (minimizing
adjudicatory errors is a proper motivation for doctrine making).
239. By way of analogy, Professor Sager points to a similar, and often repeated, inter-
pretive choice that is in part responsible for "the moral shortfall of constitutional
law"-the choice of faithfulness to historical constitutionalism over the best "from
scratch" interpretation according to the criterion of justice:
There is the text and structure of the Constitution to be contended with
as well as the historical stream of decisions by the Supreme Court and
federal and state judiciaries the Court superintends. There are also
broad patterns of congressional and presidential behavior over time, re-
flecting implicit and occasionally explicit and self-conscious judgments of
constitutional rectitude. Accordingly, some disparity between justice
and constitutional case law is the inevitable product of constitutional
law's responsibility to our constitutional past ....
SAGER, supra note 187, at 85.
240. See Aaron Jay Saiger, Constitutional Partnership and the States, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1439, 1441 (2005).
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interpretation" of the constitutional norms pertinent to preemption
would be incomplete without an examination of the views of state
legislatures. 24 1
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING PREEMPTION
I have suggested that preemption decisions have the following
structure. In place of an obvious statement of constitutional meaning
sits the Court's standing interpretive decision to underenforce both
preemption's authorizing norm and the pertinent federalism norms.
This leaves to Congress (and perhaps other actors) the task of deter-
mining the nature of its constitutional obligations with respect to pre-
emption. The constitutional rule requires determining the existence
and scope of Congress's intent to preempt. The rule simultaneously
implements the Court's underenforcement strategy by giving effect to
Congress's decisions about the constitutional meaning and reinforces
Congress's coordinate obligation to observe the full requirements of
the underenforced norms. When the Court follows this structure and
declares a state law null and void on preemption grounds, the Court
renders a necessarily constitutional holding. This is where we stand.
But what have we gained?
First, we have dispelled the confusion over the constitutional sta-
tus of preemption decisions. The underenforcement account charac-
terizes preemption decisions as instances of constitutional
adjudication, full stop. To the extent that there is reason to doubt that
Congress possesses a plenary power of preemption, underenforcement
explains what otherwise would be a problematic absence of constitu-
tional interpretation in preemption decisions. It provides the alterna-
tive to the reading of the case law which implies that Congress's
preemptive authority is, for whatever reason, bounded only by legisla-
tive imagination. 2 42 Congress is instead bound by all the require-
ments of preemption's authorizing norm and those of the pertinent
federalism norms, regardless of those norms' lack of judicial specifica-
tion. This recognition properly burdens legislators with independent
duties of constitutional fidelity.
Importantly, the underenforcement account of preemption also en-
ables public criticism when Congress strays from its constitutional du-
241. Cf. Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist
Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 32 (arguing with respect to
Commerce Clause decisions that courts might choose to defer to state, rather
than federal, legislative interpretations of the scope of Congress's commerce
power, and noting that "[iun assessing whether Congressional legislation is en-
acted 'pursuant to this Constitution' so as to trigger the Supremacy Clause, there
is no a priori reason that a modest Court should not defer to the state legisla-
ture's judgments rather than to Congress's").
242. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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ties. This criticism differs in form from the standard line that
Congress has, once again, failed to adequately account for state inter-
ests in exercising its legislative discretion. Instead, one may now com-
plain that Congress has failed to adhere to its nondefeasible
constitutional obligations. If we take constitutional obligations seri-
ously, judicially enforceable or not, then this is not a small distinction.
Professor Kramer makes the parallel point regarding our public de-
bates about Supreme Court decisions:
[W]hether we actively oppose a decision or course of decisions will depend on
whether we think the decision or course of decisions is legitimate. But judg-
ments about legitimacy turn not only on whether we agree or disagree with
the Court's results, but also on whether we feel entitled to disagree and, more
important still, to act on our disagreement. 2 4 3
Underenforcement equips us with the remedy to the disempowering
effect of legislative discretion. Now, we may both disagree with Con-
gress's actions and feel as though our view of the proper result is con-
stitutionally justified over that of Congress. Indeed, recognizing
judicial underenforcement and the corresponding congressional re-
sponsibility for constitutional enforcement may prompt Congress it-
self to reconsider its commitments when drafting potentially
preemptive legislation.
The recognition of Congress's independent constitutional obliga-
tions with respect to preemption distinguishes the underenforcement
view from accounts that locate the limitations on Congress's preemp-
tive authority solely in the structure of the federal legislative pro-
cess. 24 4 Constraints on congressional power on these process accounts
depend on the ability of representatives of state interests to bring
pressure to bear in national politics. But even when the states' repre-
sentatives are able to apply the proper pressures, the constraints on
federal power remain only hypothetical. We are left to hope that the
machinery functions ideally so that state interests are properly ex-
pressed in the final legislative product. And, perhaps more and more
these days, the machinery does not appear to function ideally.245 The
underenforcement account, by contrast, recognizes constraints that
exist, and obligate, regardless of the vagaries of the legislative pro-
cess. What is more, these constraints, by virtue of their independence
from the judicial process, avoid the criticisms generally leveled at ju-
dicial monitoring of national legislative power.24 6 As the expansion of
243. KRAMER, supra note 221, at 231 (emphasis added).
244. See generally Young, Federalisms, supra note 12, at 130-34; Young, Two Cheers,
supra note 12; supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
246. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 543, 558-60 (1954) (noting that the federal judiciary is "on weakest
ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress
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the mechanisms of preemption continues to diminish state influence
in national politics, 2 47 durable and conceptually independent con-
straints on congressional authority appear particularly desirable. Fi-
nally, the underenforcement view enables criticism independent of
process. Where the process functions exactly as it should, legislation
may nevertheless be indicted for failure to comply with the pertinent
constitutional norms. Process account advocates cannot make sense
of such criticisms; on that view the only constitutional constraint is
that the requirements of the process themselves must be observed.
The underenforcement view reinforces process constraints as well.
Professor Young argues that the presumption against preemption,
by requiring clear notice to legislators when state authority is at stake[,] ...
reduce[es] the information costs associated with mobilizing against federal
legislation.... [and] rais[es] the costs of federal lawmaking, both in terms of
drafting costs and, in some cases, by requiring a judicial remand to Congress
in order to clarify the preemptive scope of federal statutes. 2 4 8
The congressional-intent rule has the same effects, though perhaps
not to the same degree. To the extent that courts may incorrectly find
an absence of congressional intent to preempt, or incorrectly judge
congressional intent as to the scope of preemption, information costs
are lowered and federal legislative costs are raised because preemp-
tive intent must be made clearer. So, too, the underenforcement
view's requirement that Congress attend to its independent constitu-
tional obligations lowers the costs to states of mobilizing against po-
tentially harmful federal legislation and raises the deliberative and
drafting costs to Congress. In other words, underenforcement pro-
vides a "constitutional red flag" for preemption in the legislative
context. 24 9
I do not claim that recognizing preemption decisions as instances
of underenforcement will necessarily advance our ability to predict
what courts will do. One likely could ignore underenforcement alto-
gether and predict judicial decisions just as well on the purely statu-
tory account of preemption. Nor does the underenforcement account
suggest that courts are doing anything fundamentally wrong in pre-
emption cases. It does, however, help explain what courts in preemp-
tion cases have been doing. The proposed view also may prove useful
in explaining and predicting the behavior of Congress with respect to
preemption. It would be interesting indeed to see whether congres-
sional debates and enactments demonstrate recognition of preemp-
tion-related constitutional obligations. In fact, given judicial
in the interests of the states"); Young, Federalisms, supra note 12, at 91-122 (giv-
ing an overview of these criticisms).
247. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
248. Young, Federalisms, supra note 12, at 132.
249. Young, Two Cheers, supra note 12, at 1384; see supra notes 16-19 and accompa-
nying text.
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underenforcement, an investigation of Congress's views on preemp-
tion norms may be the only way to finally settle the question of the
precise nature of the pertinent constitutional norms.
More abstractly, and as others have argued, attempts to correct
confusions and misunderstandings about concepts in constitutional
law contribute in a meaningful way to the extrajudicial debates that
are a driving force of our constitutionalism and political culture.2 50 I
believe that resolving (or at least trying to resolve) the confusion about
the nature of preemption decisions makes a particularly valuable con-
tribution because preemption is often left out of constitutional debates
altogether. Professor Kramer insists that "[wle need processes, formal
and informal, by which our constitutional understandings and com-
mitments can be challenged, reinterpreted, and renewed."2 5 1 Hashing
out constitutional confusions outside the courts is an important infor-
mal process for "enrich[ing] the Constitution's political, cultural, and
extra-adjudicatory value."25 2 As Professor Berman notes, "given the
singular role that the Constitution plays in our political culture....
we do not want the actual, predicted, or imagined outcome of litigation
to be conclusive of our arguments about whether any particular, ac-
tual, or proposed course of governmental action conforms to constitu-
tional demands."253
But if we believe that the Court's performance in preemption cases
is for some reason deficient, we should, in our extrajudicial discourse,
suggest correctives. This is so even if we have only a slim hope that
the Court will adopt our suggestions. On that note, let me suggest two
minor doctrinal changes. Preemption issues should be treated like
any other constitutional issues for purposes of Pullman abstention
and the rule that courts, where possible, should decide issues in the
order that avoids constitutional questions. 254 Preemption decisions
cannot be categorically excluded from the operation of these rules
since the rules apply to constitutional questions in general. 2 55 One
might think that we need not worry about addressing preemption
250. See generally KRAMER, supra note 221; Berman, supra note 30, at 83-88 (touting
contributions to "[e]xtra-adjudicatory [c]onstitutionalism"); Larry D. Kramer, The
Supreme Court 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REV. 4, 15-16
(2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We the Court]; Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court
2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4 (2003).
251. Kramer, We the Court, supra note 250, at 15.
252. Berman, supra note 30, at 86.
253. Id. at 16.
254. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. This "last resort" or "procedural
avoidance" rule is distinct from the rule that where there is a reasonable alterna-
tive construction of a statute that avoids a construction that raises constitutional
problems. See Kloppenberg, supra note 9, at 1018-24; Young, supra note 170, at
1574-76.
255. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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questions because they do not require judicial constitutional interpre-
tation. But preemption decisions give effect to congressional constitu-
tional interpretations and thus constitute the judicial enforcement of
constitutional norms against state legislative prerogatives-the very
countermajoritarian effect that the rules are intended to minimize.25 6
And since it is state legislative prerogatives that are nullified in pre-
emption cases, federalism interests also weigh in favor of avoidance
and abstention.2 57 Application of these rules in preemption decisions
is called for by the understanding that such decisions are instances of
standard-model constitutional adjudication. This would begin the
process of incorporating preemption's constitutional status into our
practice, and also would help to decrease the adverse effects of wide-
spread preemption on the autonomy of state governments.
V. CONCLUSION
The account of preemption decisions I have offered is primarily de-
scriptive. Even if we think that preemption is dangerous to the states,
that it is "jurispathic"258 and, in its malleability, difficult to constrain,
it is too late in the day to try to put the genie back in the bottle. The
only feasible remedy, it seems, is to proceed as Justice Breyer and Pro-
fessor Young suggest-by carefully attending to the federalism impli-
cations of preemption case-by-case, "at retail."2 59 Success requires a
proper understanding of what, conceptually, preemption cases are
about. More than this, it requires an adjustment of emphasis. Treat-
ing preemption decisions as mere exercises in statutory construction
makes it easy for key players to overlook preemption's importance to
the constitutional structure. I believe that the underenforcement view
of preemption offers both a better description of our practice and a
reason to place greater emphasis on preemption issues when they
arise. Our decisionmaking will only improve with a fuller understand-
ing of the normative landscape in which preemption decisions, judi-
cial, congressional, and otherwise, are situated.
I realize that I have left much for future work. The following is-
sues need further exposition: the source of preemption's authorizing
norm; the nature of the substantive limitations on Congress's author-
256. See Kloppenberg, supra note 9, at 1047-55.
257. See id. at 1047-66.
258. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 40-41 (1983) (stating that judicial elimination of
competing sources of law is "jurispathic"); Hoke, Pathologies, supra note 2, at 694
('[A] ruling of federal preemption is inherently 'jurispathic'; it kills off one line,
perhaps even an entire scheme, of a particular community's law." (quoting Cover,
supra, at 40)).
259. See Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 160-61 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Young, Federalism Doctrine, supra note 12, at 1822; Young, Federal-
isms, supra note 12, at 141.
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ity that arise from that norm; the precise role of federalism norms in
preemption decisions; whether Congress in practice has accounted for
the proper normative constraints; the states' understanding of the
limits of preemption; and whether, given a full understanding of pre-
emption's normative outlines, modern varieties of preemption are in
fact justifiable. Despite an abundance of worthy scholarship, preemp-
tion remains confusing. I want to try to make it clearer. I think that
my proposed reconciliation of the structure of preemption decisions
with our intuitions about the constitutional status of preemption is a
good first step in that larger project.
